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This essay is an exploration of the interplay and overlap of spirituality, politics,
and the state through an examination of the shaping of spiritual expression in late New
Order Indonesia. Spirituality, in its effable, social forms, constantly interacts with
political power and other social structures. Although we are frequently reminded of the
difficulty, and, to some degree, impossibility, of separating religion and politics, the
academic desire to parse one from the other is widespread. This essay is a preliminary
investigation of one particularly fertile example of the interconnection of spirituality and
nationality, and how these interact with the state. I aim to view the explicit connection
between spirituality, nationalism, and political power by analyzing Indonesian state
discourse regarding spiritual organizations.
I argue two things: one, that the New Order attempted to contain spiritual
expression and interpretation within the rubric of the first principle of the state's
ideology, Pancasila; and two, that since the two spiritual groups examined here were
invested in Indonesian nationalism, they participated to varying degrees in the
government's inscription of the first principle of state ideology in their own teachings,
practices, and beliefs. They also participated in state bureaucracy through other means.
In other words, they did not shy away from interaction with the state, and may have in
some ways welcomed it. At various periods of time in Indonesia's history, and in
different ways, spiritual expression was also patriotic expression. Prior to the New Order
(General Suharto's authoritarian regime that lasted from 1966 -.1998), spiritual/patriotic
expression was not limited in the way that it became during the regime. Viewing late
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New Order state discourse of spiritual groups shows how the regime attempted to place
limitations on spiritual expression and patriotic or nationalistic expression.
Paguyuban Ngesti Tunggal (Pangestu) and Sumarah, two long-lived spiritual
organizations, embedded their own visions of Indonesian nationalism in their spiritual
practice and historical development. From their inception, these groups have been
invested in Indonesian nationalism. By their inclusion in a government project to
inventory spiritual groups, they have been shown as respectable. Respectability,
however, only became necessary only with the crackdown in the 1970s on political and
spiritual expression as the New Order regime tightened its control. The New Order thus
both necessitated and offered spiritual and patriotic respectability to spiritual groups.
This respectability came at a cost: the groups were also discursively restricted to the
state's vision of nationalism within the framework of Pancasila.
The primary material for my analysis comes from the government inventory
project. Coupled with historical contextualization, the inventory project provides a
wealth of information about New Order attempts to control the various forms of spiritual,
theological, and cosmological understandings of its citizens in order to ensure the
primacy of state ideology. It should be noted that from the sources available to me, I can
make claims only about the attempts at control as evidenced by the texts. Whether these
attempts were efficacious, and in what ways is a question that I am unable to answer with
the sources available to me. This point is however, an important issue for future research
and raises a necessary caveat for any discussion of state control: states are rarely as
effective as their policies present them. The New Order state seems to have been highly
successful in imposing state ideology on the majority of Indonesians. But studies of the
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attempts at imposition, such as this one, cannot address the results, and we should not
confuse the two.
My main source material is a slim volume published in 1989 by the Department
of Education and Culture. Covering the region of Jakarta and West Java, it records the
history, beliefs, teachings, and values of five "groups for the experiential practice of
belief in the One Supreme God."' This volume is one in an inventory series published
by regional Departments of Education and Culture, starting in 1980 and, quite possibly,
continuing until today. The series is a way for the state to attempt to enforce a particular
set of teachings and values in these groups by writing them as such; yet it is also a way in
which these spiritual groups acquire a certain kind of culturally authoritative status in
Indonesia even though they do not, according to the state, constitute religions.
Pangestu and Sumarah, of the many spiritual organizations in Indonesia, provide
interesting case studies that complicate issues of state control and nationalism. In many
ways these spiritual organizations and the state are aligned in their goals of creating a
strong national culture and identity and promoting the Indonesian state. Pangestu and
Sumarah are explicitly nationalistic in their outlook. In addition, the groups come from
central Java (Yogyakarta and Surakarta, respectively), generally considered the cultural
heartland of Indonesia, especially by the New Order government. That they are
catalogued in the Jakarta and West Java inventory shows how national they are; they
moved their headquarters to the nation's capital. At the same time, the birthplace and the
relation of the founders to the traditional courts of Java give concrete focus to the claim
of cultural inheritance. Also, government promotion of these groups helps them gain
cultural legitimacy, benefiting them by increasing their popularity. In my presentation of
1Kelompok penghayat kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa is the Indonesian phrase.
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state discourse about these groups, I do not intend to efface the ways in which these
spiritual groups may have been active and willing partners in the government's
inscription of state ideology. However, in the end, it was the New Order bureaucracy that
wrote the inventory reports and New Order discourse that held sway. Without arguing
whether Pangestu and Sumarah agreed with the information in the inventory reports, I
focus my analysis on the state discourse surrounding them. Examining how and in what
ways the spiritual groups agreed or disagreed with government discourse about them
would be an interesting topic for further research.
Throughout this paper, I use the terms spiritual groups and spiritual organizations.
These are translations of the Indonesian term kelompok kepercayaan and refer to the two
specific groups in question and the category of organizations examined by the
government inventory project. There are many Indonesian terms used to describe the
experiential, spiritual practice for the goal (almost always) of union between human and
divine, and "kepercayaan" is the term favored by the government. Of the other terms
(kebatinan, kerohanian, kejiwaan), it is the one that least approximates the experiential
nature of this kind of spiritual practice, focusing as it does on believing (percaya). The
other terms are derived from the inner aspect of spirituality - batin, the inner soul, roh, or
rohani, spirit/spiritual, often contrasted with jasmani, the physical body, and jiwa, also
meaning spirit or soul. By using kepercayaan, the New Order government picked a term
that underplays the inner experiential nature of spiritual practice and emphasizes the
intellectual aspect of belief.
This paper is organized in three broad sections. The first gives the historical
context surrounding Pangestu and Sumarah. It traces relevant intellectual ideas in
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currency around and preceding the time the two groups began (1930s). It also analyzes
other examples of spiritual discourse in politics in the early post-independence period and
other major players and events significant to understand the place of spiritual
organizations, as they came to be known, in the nation. In the post-1965 period,
significant events include New Order policies that increasingly restricted expression to
the rhetoric of state ideology. The second section describes the inventory project and the
two organizations, offering theoretical background on the ideological agenda of the New
Order state and background on the two organizations. The third section provides an
analysis of the discourse used by the state to enshrine state ideology, as well as other
ideological agendas, within the fabric of the groups. These other agendas include
nationalism, modernism, monotheism, and standardization of spiritual interpretation and
national identity.
The Context
This section traces broad outlines of the spcial and historical context in which
Pangestu and Sumarah arose and provides detailed information regarding the changing
interactions between the government and individual spiritual groups or leaders. Both
Pangestu and Sumarah arose during the late Dutch colonial period in Java; both leaders
came from court cultures of central Java; and most significantly, both groups were
committed to the idea of Indonesian nationalism. Post-independence, there was no sharp
dividing line between the era when spiritual groups and state government genuinely saw
themselves as working for and in tandem with each other for the joint goal of promoting
Indonesian national character and national integrity and the later era when the New Order
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came to see spiritual groups as a threat, if not to nationalism per se, to state authority, and
attempted to conflate and direct the voices of spiritual groups into a single voice singing
the praises of national ideology. Yet this change did happen, and it occurred gradually
between 1954 and 1971. In this section I present a historical description of the change in
the position of spiritual groups in the state, without attempting to single out one
particularly definitive moment or event. Instead, a variety of factors, some concurrent,
some causative of others, led to the policies that started in 1954 and ultimately led to the
discursive restriction of mystical groups.
The change in the position of mystical groups underlines a deeper historical
change within the Indonesian state. This line, which was crossed as Suharto solidified his
control over the government, reduced popular national enthusiasm to authoritarian
paralysis and turned aspiration into ideology. Government control over expression
occurred in many realms, not just the spiritual. Like many authoritarians, Suharto
restricted the press, imprisoned political dissidents, outlawed political parties and
replaced them with his organization, Golkar, and made a sham of Indonesian democracy.
This was all done under the guise of security and development, with Suharto presenting
himself as doing what was best for the nation.
Before the presentation of specific events that together created the changed place
of spiritual groups in the New Order state, I will sketch an overview of the intellectual
atmosphere and social influences current in Java at the time of and immediately
preceding the revelations which led to the founding of Sumarah and Pangestu. Three
intellectual ideas are essential to understanding the backgrounds of the spiritual
organizations. These are: theosophy, nationalism, and modernity, especially religious
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modernity. These ideas will be discussed later in the specific context of the spiritual
organizations. At this point, a simple introduction will suffice.
One of the intellectual streams in currency in early 1900s Java was theosophy.
The Theosophical Society started in the United States in 1875 and its core teachings
sought a rapprochement between science and religion. It combined "the idea of evolution
with religious concepts chiefly from Hinduism and Buddhism." Helena Petrovna
Blavatsky, of table-rapping seance fame, and Annie Besant, an Englishwoman who
actively campaigned for Indian independence, were two leaders of the Society at the turn
of the 20h century and into the early 1900s.2 In the Dutch East Indies, a Dutch
Theosophical Society was also established, and Clifford Geertz notes that it was an
influence on several spiritual groups, especially Budi Setia, which was founded by
federalist civil servants cooperating with the Dutch in 1949. This group held its meetings
with the permission of and under the direction of the Dutch chief of police, who was also
interested in theosophy. 3 Another organization, Hardopusoro, was founded prior to
independence as a theosophical organization for natives, and the founders of Sumarah
and Pangestu were both involved in Hardopusoro for a limited time. In Europe and the
United States, theosophy was anti-cleric, anti-denominational, and somewhat anti-
establishment. Its leaders were on the fringe of society and tended to support leftist
causes such as Indian independence and women's emancipation before they were popular
among the general public. It was also imbued with modern optimism for the future and
the idea that human perfection was possible in the near future. According to Bruce
Campbell, Asians tended to see theosophy as a way to value their traditions, such as
2 Bruce Campbell, Ancient Wisdom Revived A History of the Theosophical Movement, 61.
3 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, 340.
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Hinduism and Buddhism, in a decidedly modern way.4 The modern bent in Pangestu and
Sumarah, as will be evident in the discussion of the organizations below, backs up
Campbell's claim, although it is not due to the influence of theosophy and Hardopusoro
alone. The presences of theosophy, as well as modernism, at the turn of the century in
Java were important influences on Pangestu and Sumarah.
Other intellectual influences in Javanese society when the founders of Pangestu
and Sumarah were maturing were nationalism and Indonesian independence. Raden
Sunarto of Pangestu and Raden Ngabehi Sukinohartono of Sumarah first experienced
revelations in 1932 and 1935, respectively. Prior to their wahyu, in the early 1900s mass
organizations promoting various kinds of nationalism, such as Boedi Oetomo, Jong Java,
Sarekat Islam, and Muhammadiyah, had formed. The anti-colonial movement in the
1930s experienced a crackdown from the Dutch regime, which, starting in 1927,
according to the historian Merle Ricklefs, "entered the most repressive phase of its
twentieth-century history."5 It would not be long until World War II broke out (1939),
the Japanese invaded Indonesia (1942), the Japanese retreated as they lost the Pacific War
(1945), and the Revolution began (1945-1950). The backdrop of anticipatory enthusiasm
for nationalism and incipient independence which preceded the 1930s and returned with
the revolutionary battles must be recognized as vital to the intellectual climate out of
which Pangestu and Sumarah rose.
Modernity was essential to nationalism and independence for one reason because
it shaped institutional and participatory forms for the new nation. It also influenced how
Sumarah and Pangestu defined themselves. As we shall see in the discussion of the
4 Campbell, Ancient Wisdom Revived, 73.
5 Merle Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 181.
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groups, both Pangestu and Sumarah attempted to define themselves against what they
considered to be outmoded forms of spiritual practice, asserting that they did not practice
esoteric arts or teach superstitions. They also aligned themselves with recognized
religious traditions, asserting that their teachings complemented conventional religious
practice and could even be used to improve that practice. Since Pangestu and Sumarah
did not go against any major world religion, they could then be considered as universal as
any world religion, their practitioners as modern as any practicing Christian or Muslim.
With this kind of modernity, they would be truly fitted for the new, modern, independent
Republic of Indonesia. To be associated with traditional esoteric arts, on the other hand,
would be to be considered behind the times, traditional and limited instead of national
and expansive.
Materials on spiritual groups emphasize the ability to leave outmoded tradition
behind but retain indigenous elements that benefit national Indonesia. A reminder of the
danger of klenik6 was clear in a speech Sukarno gave to mystical groups at the
Congressional Body for Indonesian Beliefs (BKKI) in 1958. In this highly modern
institutional form (a congress) and discursive space (a presidential speech), the spiritual
leaders responded by reiterating that they absolutely did not teach kenik.7 Within
Pangestu and Sumarah materials there is a great degree of emphasis on how mystical
practice helps the nation. In a small booklet entitled "Function and Meaning of
Mysticism for Individuals and the Revolution" published in 1965, Sarwedi Sosrosudigdo
emphasizes, again, the difference between spirituality and negative and positive esoteric
arts. Spirituality should be completely sincere, and must be practiced with no selfish or
6 Klenik is an important Javanese concept which refers to that which is forbidden and those potent
mysteries/mysterious powers that should remain secret and hidden from open view.
' Niels Mulder, Mysticism in Java Ideology in Indonesia, 23.
11
self-aggrandizing desires. This kind of sincerity is missing from "black esoteric arts
(magi hitam), which obviously goes against spirituality, while even white esoteric arts
(magi putih) is not the highest level of spirituality." Sosrosudigdo also addresses several
ways in his view through which mysticism actually aided the success of the revolution. 8
Theosophy, nationalism, and religious modernism formed a great part of the
intellectual atmosphere in which R. Sunarto and R. Ng. Kino received their divine
teachings. The following section of this essay describes the founders of the two groups.
Prior to that, we now turn to a discussion of national history as it pertains to the two
groups. The history of government-spiritual group interactions within the scope of this
essay can be divided into two eras: early independence and the Sukarno period (1945 -
1965), and the earlier New Order period (1965 - 1990). 1965 serves as a good dividing
year because of the change in government wrought then and the traumatic event it
indexes: the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians accused of membership in
the Indonesian Communist Party in the wake of the military coup of October 1 t, 1965
through which Gen. Suharto eventually took control of the executive office and ruled as
president until 1998. Years, however, do not generally function well as starting or ending
points of social phenomena. The crackdown against spiritual groups that grew to full size
in the Suharto era began in the Sukarno era. In the revolutionary and Sukarno period,
Indonesia saw the growth of political parties and autonomous governance. Spiritual
groups were involved in both. This period also saw the beginning of what would become
a long crackdown on spiritual organizations and limitation of expression for spiritual
groups, continuing in the New Order under Suharto. Under the New Order and
8 Sarwedi Sosrosudigdo, Fungsi dan Arti Kebatinan untuk Pribadi dan Revolusi, 11-12. The Indonesian
reads: "Djangankan magi hitam, jang terang bertentangan dengan kebatinan, bahkan magi putihpun belum
merupakan tingkatan kebatinan jang tertinggi."
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Indonesia's military strongman Suharto, spiritual groups were first the objects of
government surveillance, and then were instituted in the framework of the state and
pinned into place under state ideology. The institutionalization of spiritual organizations
is key at this time period.
In the early independence period, there were two organizations that stand out as
frontrunners for the involvement of mysticism in politics. It should be noted that
religious involvement in politics was more common than not, and that Islamic political
parties were one of the major factions of post-independence politics, along with the
Communist and the Nationalist parties. There were also Christian and Catholic political
parties. Organized groups of self-proclaimed spiritual leaders as a part of party politics
and national politics were not uncommon. One instance of formal spiritual involvement
in politics was the BKKI and its founder, Wongsonegoro. Another element of mystical
politics was in the political party Permai.
Wongsonegoro was a member of the native elite and an independence activist
starting in 1918 with the organization Jong Java.9 First known as RT. Djaksodipoero, he
held positions in the Susuhunan's court in Surakarta. In the colonial period, he was a
member of Boedi Oetomo as well as Jong Java. He was also a part of Narpowandowo, a
court association for family of the Susuhunan. He eventually completed a law degree in
Batavia, earning him the title Mr. Wongsonegoro, and in 1931 he was part of a secret
plan in the Susuhunan to annex the Mangkunegaran court, the other royal court of
Surakarta.' 0 After independence, Wongsonegoro was involved in national politics and
was a champion for the place of mysticism in the nation.
9 Maskan, Tokoh Wongsonegoro, 8.
10 George Larson, Prelude to Revolution, 137, 158.
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After independence was declared on August 17, 1945 by Sukarno, Wongsonegoro
was appointed by the Independence Preparatory Committee to a commission charged
with making the final changes in the national Constitution. 1 At that time he was able to
tweak the wording of the constitution, so that "belief' (kepercayaan) was protected as
well as "religion" (agama). For his actions in this role, Paul Stange calls Wongsonegoro
the "father of political mystical movements during the fifties" 12 and tells an anecdote of
how the wording of the Indonesian Constitution to include the phrase "religion and
belief' (agamanya dan kepercayaannya) came about. After the meeting in which the
Constitution was finalized, Pringgodigdo and Wongsonegoro typed up the draft. The
section on religion (paragraph 29, part XI) established that the nation was based on faith
in the One Supreme God, and that the nation guarantees the freedom to worship. The
section reads:
1. The nation is based on faith in God (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa).
2. The nation guarantees each citizen the freedom to choose his own religion and to pray
according to his own religion or faith (.. . beribadat menurut agamanya dan kepercayaannya
itu).'3
In the above quotation, Paul Stange renders kepercayaan as faith. This may be an
acceptable translation, but is it important to note that the meaning of kepercayaan has
been specifically tied to the idea of kelompok kepercayaan, spiritual groups, and thus
does not have the abstract sense that the English word faith does. Rather, it indicates
membership: one may belong to a religious group and to a spiritual group, and thus have
religion and "kepercayaan," spiritual beliefs. Stange also translates "dan" as or, while in
" George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 138.
12 Paul Stange, "'Legitimate' Mysticism in Indonesia," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, vol.
20, no. 2 (1986), 87.
" Ibid.
14
fact it means and. Stange is perhaps overzealous in seeing kepercayaan as equal to
agama (religion), and thus a valid replacement for it, in the Indonesian state. This has
never been the case. Nor was there the understanding that religion and spiritual beliefs
were mutually exclusive, necessitating the choice of one over the other.
Stange continues that Wongsonegoro
protested that the sense of the discussion had been that kebatinan movements were also
guaranteed. Pringgodigdo appears to have felt that direct reference to kebatinan would have been
too strong, but he agreed with Wongsonegoro's interpretation of the sense of the meeting.14
They compromised with "kepercayaan," added it to the Constitution, and when the
Constitution was approved the next day there was no time for close scrutiny by the
committee. The addition of kepercayaan to the Constitution has cemented the legal basis
for, if not the continued protection, at least the continued existence of spiritual groups.
While the importance of kepercayaan in the Constitution is not small, for some
spiritual practicioners, it is a success that indicates a larger failure. In the 1950s, many
spiritual leaders wanted spiritual groups to be considered the same as religions and thus
have the same legal status. That the only recognized religions in Indonesia were foreign
imports struck many as being against the spirit of national independence. Spiritual
groups never received the recognition they desired, although some groups, such as Sapta
Darma, continued fighting for it into the 1970s. 5
One of the organizations fighting for recognition as religions was the
Congressional Body for Indonesian Beliefs (Badan Kongres Kepercayaan Indonesia, or
BKKI). Wongsonegoro established the BKKI in 1955 and was its leading





kepercayaan would be allowed and legitimated as a valid form of worship for
Indonesians. Beyond lobbying for spirituality to be given the same status as religions,
which the BKKI did mostly strenuously in 1957, its 1962 seminar stressed the
relationship between spiritual practice and national struggle.17 Another site for spiritual
activism for Wongsonegoro was the political party he established, the Partai Indonesia
Raya (PIR), through which he attempted to bring mystical associations together.18
Another organization that further entwined mysticism with national politics was the
political party Permai.
In Clifford Geertz's The Religion of Java, Permai is defined as a political party
and a mystical (abangan, in his terminology) sect. The doctrine of Permai, according to
Geertz, is
a fusion between modern nationalist ideology, particularly as set forth in the Pantjasila ... and
such traditional Javanese religious patterns as calendrical divination, food symbolism, and
methods of spiritual discipline, plus a new note of explicit moralism designed to combat Moslem
moralism on the one hand and to connect up traditional peasant values such as rukun (cooperation
... ) with Marxist ethics on the other.19
Pancasila, in Permai interpretation according to Geertz, represented a mystical "micro-
macrocosm correspondence theory in which the individual is seen to be but a small
replica of the state, and the state but an enlarged image of the individual." Permai was
nationalistic in the sense that it promotes its doctrine as indigenous, a native Javanese
science beneficial for the Indonesian nation. Geertz focused on the Permai organization
in his fieldwork site in the 1950s as a way to show that "heightened political struggle
naturally results in a sharpened internal conflict between various religious groups.
" Ibid., 88-89.
18 Mulder, 22.
19 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, 115.
20 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 161.
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Religious positions become political ones - almost without alteration." 2 1 While this
statement certainly requires more qualification to be entirely believable, in the case of
1950s Indonesia it does remind one how close various revolutionary and early nationalist
political movements and political parties were to religious positions. Whether this was
due to the intrinsic closeness between religion and politics or because religions affiliation
was one of the most salient marker of difference during that time period, the relationship
between religion and politics is key to viewing the connection between spirituality and
nationalism in Indonesia and creates difficulty in separating spirituality from politics and
ideology.
The relationship between spiritual groups and the state turned somewhat
unfriendly in 1954 with the establishment of the Body for the Surveillance of Society's
Spiritual Groups (Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, or Pakem). This
organization was first under the Department of Religion, and then in 1960 was moved to
the Department of Justice. Pakem attempted to control spiritual organizations because of
the clear worries on the part of the government about its ability to control these groups
and the potential unrest they might cause. By 1961 the fear, on the part of the
Department of Religion, of "communist infiltration" in spiritual groups was high. Pakem
took action, by prosecuting individuals and outlawing organizations, generally only on
the suspicion of communist involvement, bodily harm or death, or anti-Islamic activities
within the spiritual groups. 22 Pakem had methods more delicate than prosecution as well;
it also "organized regular meetings of representatives of different mystical groups and
21 Geertz, The Religion of Java, 363.
22 Mulder, 24 and 63.
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kept records of meetings" 23 and in this sense performed surveillance rather than
repression, although a distinction between the two might not always be clear. Antoon
Geels reports that in 1964 Pakem registered 360 spiritual groups, but by 1971 there were
only 217 groups, 177 of which were located in central Java. Pangestu, however, was
apparently a safe choice in early New Order Indonesia, as it had more than 50,000
followers at the beginning of the 1970s.24 The numbers reveal the efficiency of the
crackdown on spiritual groups after 1965, a crackdown which started earlier but exploded
in intensity after the coup.
In 1961, the debate about the status of spiritual groups vis-a-vis religions was laid
to rest. In that year, a definition for religion that had been proposed by the Department of
Religion in 1952 was accepted as law. This definition of religion effectively disallowed
citizens from being only members of a spiritual organization and required that they
confess one of the six major faith traditions allowed by the state: Islam, Protestantism,
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, or Confucianism. Confucianism was later dropped
from this list despite the great lengths to which Confucian groups went to make
Confucianism more similar to Christianity and Islam. In 1967 the Congress of Confucian
Religion (Kongres Agama Kong Hu Cu) decided on texts to use as a holy book (called
collectively "Alkitab Agama Kong Hu Cu"), created a role for a priest-like figure in
worship, and added a word to their practices to approximate "amen" as Christians and
Muslims use it. In late January of 1979, Presidential Instruction dictated that
23 Stange, "'Legitimate' Mysticism," 82.
24 Antoon Geels, Subud and the Javanese Mystical Tradition, 82. It is important to note that some of
Pangestu's members in particular were very close to the regime. Among them were Sudjarwo, who was a
minister is Suharto's government as well as the treasurer of Yayasan Supersemar. (Personal
communication, Nancy Florida, 7/24/07)
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Confucianism was not a religion, and they lost permission to hold their annual
conference. 25
Confucianism and spiritual groups share similarities in that they were both
considered by the state to be insufficient on their own for religious practice, but both
could be corollary to religion. In explaining the 1979 Presidential Instruction,
Confucianism is defined as a "philosophy" and therefore one could be Muslim or
Christian and use Confucian philosophy with no inconsistency. 26 Spiritual groups,
however, had a more comfortable position than Confucianism. In 1973 the rules were
changed by the government and "belief' (kepercayaan) became a legitimate choice for
the religion category on one's identity card. Ironically, Stange notes that this was never
widely practiced. Paul Stange argues that by this point, most Indonesians were
sufficiently intimidated by the 1965-66 violence and the general threat of state violence
that they retained affiliation with one of the major religions. 27 This early period of the
New Order shows the changed place of spiritual organizations from the revolution to the
end of Sukarno's rule and set the stage for future institutionalization and/or repression of
spiritual groups in the image of state ideology in the later New Order period.
The primary way that institutionalization of spiritual groups took place was
through the document Pancasila and indoctrination thereof that took place in the New
Order. Pancasila is the preamble to the Undang-Undang Dasar, the "Basic Articles," or
Indonesian Constitution. Pancasila can be translated as "five principles" on which the
nation of Indonesia is founded. The five principles are: Supreme monotheism, fair and
25 Leo Suryadinata, "Kong Hu Cuisme dan Agama Kong Hu Cu di Indonesia Sebuah Kajian Awal" in
Konfusianisme di Indonesia Pergulatan Mencari Jati Diri, 196-200
26 Ibid., 200
27 Stange, "'Legitimate' Mysticism in Indonesia," 90-91.
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just humanity, Indonesian nationalism, representative government, and social equality for
all Indonesians.28 From the New Order's point of view, Pancasila was a statement of
patriotism and the source of state ideology. This was true also for Sukarno during his
Old Order; however, during the New Order, only one interpretation of Pancasila was
acceptable, Suharto's interpretation, whereas during the Old Order, a proliferation of
independent interpretations existed. The New Order redefined Pancasila discourse in
narrow, unitary terms, and attempted to impose this definition on Indonesian citizens
through various methods of indoctrination. Most important for the institutionalization of
spiritual groups in the framework of Pancasila is the first principle, that of Supreme
monotheism, and, related to this, the naming of God as the One Supreme God. The
phrase "Tuhan Yang Maha Esa" is taken from the first principle "ketuhanan Yang Maha
Esa." The "One Supreme God" is used throughout the government inventory reports,
forming in this way the basic foundation of government discourse about spiritual groups.
The repetition of the phrase serves the attempt to situate spiritual groups as first and
foremost proponents of Suharto's New Order state ideology.
Douglas Ramage notes the extreme importance that Pancasila had for the New
Order. Pancasila was "used by the government as a potent means of proscribing political
behavior in Indonesia" and was also "an effective means of delineating the permissible
boundaries of political discourse and behavior for thirty years." 29 Within general, and not
just spiritual New Order Pancasila discourse, by far the most important of the five
principles is the first. Partly, this is due to the context in which that Pancasila ideology
arose. The New Order made Communism into its permanent bogeyman, and the state
28 Kenneth R. Redden and Linda L. Schlueter, Modern Legal Systems Cyclopedia, 2.60.10.
29 Douglas Ramage, Politics in Indonesia Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance, 6.
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made "godless Communists" incompatible with the principle of the Supreme Oneness of
God, even though this was clearly contrary to fact; in a Muslim-majority nation with one
of the largest Communist parties in the world prior to 1965, it is impossible for there not
to be overlap and hence, Muslim Communists. Anti-Communism (implicit in Pancasila
ideology) became a marker of true allegiance to the state through the repeated assertions
of the Supreme monotheism in the language of Pancasila, always in the phrase ketuhanan
Yang Maha Esa. These repeated assertions, and Pancasila as the primary state document,
ties belief in God to belief in the state. This conflation of belief, then, prescribed
religious belief (in the God fashioned by the state) and political behavior (allegiance to
the New Order). In the following sections of this paper, the use of the language of
Pancasila to define, direct, control, or otherwise set boundaries for spiritual groups will
be discussed at length. At this point, it is important to see how the focus of the New
Order on Pancasila became essential to the state's legitimacy.
As early as 1966, after taking power, Suharto declared that the ideology of the
state would be based on Pancasila alone. This was a move to discredit the various
ideological statements of his predecessor, Sukarno, with whom at that point Suharto still
had to battle for legitimacy.30 In 1967, Suharto declared October 1t a national holiday,
Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (Sacred Pancasila Day). The date commemorates the coup that
took place in 1965 and has at least two functions, according to the historian Katharine
McGregor. It was a way for the regime to present itself as the protector of Pancasila and
it was a way for Suharto to overcome the shadow of Sukarno. June 1 S was known as the
Birthday of Pancasila (Hari Kelahiran Pancasila) and as Sacred Pancasila Day was
promoted, the Birthday of Pancasila was downgraded (although outside of a large
3 Merle Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia, 292.
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celebration in 1964, it never celebrated with the ritual and predictable fanfare with which
Sacred Pancasila Day came to be celebrated). 31 If the birth of Pancasila indexed Sukarno,
the defense of Pancasila would come, in New Order terms, to index Suharto.
Sacred Pancasila Day came to be a major annual event in the New Order. It was
celebrated publicly, and in 1980, after the film The Treachery of the September 30
Movement (Pengkhianatan Gerakan 30 September) was made, it became required
viewing for all schoolchildren on that day. This film repeated the official line about the
Communist movement and the events of the 30 of September, 1965. It also graphically
represented the supposed savagery of the Communists. The same story could be found
represented visually and in diorama form in the Sacred Pancasila Monument Museum
which was constructed around the well from which the bodies of the six generals were
extracted at Lubang Buaya, Jakarta. The monument was constructed soon after the coup,
and the museum built around it opened in 1973. Reasons for the museum given by
Suharto, according to McGregor, were to, "increase alertness to protect Pancasila from
enemies who seek to undermine or destroy the Pancasila and to instil awareness of the
sacredness of the Pancasila."32 Pancasila in this way was made into the one-word answer
as to why Indonesia needed the New Order. The museum and the holiday Sacred
Pancasila Day show the extent to which the regime depended on Pancasila for legitimacy
and thus invested heavily in imposing its own monolithic definition of Pancasila.
Throughout Suharto's regime, Pancasila ideology became more and more rigid.
In 1978 the parliament created the P4 program, an indoctrination program of Pancasila
for all levels of society. While this resolution was not unanimously popular - Nahdlatul
3' Katharine McGregor, History in Uniform Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past, 86.
32 Ibid., 83-84.
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Ulama party representatives walked out of the deliberations in protest33 - it has been
effective. By 1985, the government had successfully required all organizations by law to
be based on Pancasila as their "sole foundation" (asas tunggal) or banned those that
refused. 34
Pancasila in New Order discourse and through representations like Sacred
Pancasila Day and the Sacred Pancasila Monument Museum is intertwined with the
origins of the New Order - the coup of September 30', 1965 through which Suharto rose
to power. The New Order held Pancasila up as the total source of authority for the state,
and through doing so, attempted to subsume other systems or beliefs underneath it, flatten
existent differences, exclude dissent, and limit discourse. The inventory project is one
example of this attempt.
The New Order, like most authoritarian regimes, was not open to civil
participation in politics. It repressed Islamic civil participation especially forcefully until
close to its end in the early 1990s. The relationship between the New Order and spiritual
groups, however, was a bit more ambiguous. At the same time it outlawed political
participation by spiritual groups and demanding that the groups accept state ideology, as
was demanded of all civil organizations, the New Order institutionalized spiritual groups
through several bureaucratic forms and in this way attempted to tie spiritual expression
within these groups to positive expression of state ideology. These bureaucracies were 1)
the Indonesian Congress of Beliefs, Spirituality, and Mysticism (Badan Kongres
Kepercayaan Kejiwaan Kerohanian Kebatinan Indonesia, or BK5I), which was a
temporary organization out of which the SKK grew; 2) the Secretariat for Cooperation
3 Ramage, 32.
3 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam, 17.
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between Spiritual Groups (Sekretariat Kerjasama antar Kepercayaan, or SKK), which
was a part of the ruling party Golkar and founded in 1970; 3) the Directory for Guidance
of Experiential Spirituality (Direktorat Pembinaan Penghayat Kepercayaan) within the
Department of Education and Culture, which was established in 1979.35 As previously
discussed, Pakem, established in 1954, was another government body that worked to
control spiritual groups. Pakem, rather than working to institutionalize a certain kind of
spirituality, repressed spiritual groups deemed a danger to society and for this reason is
not included in the following discussion.
Hefner describes the relationship between Suharto and mystical groups as
"fickle." 36 "In its first two years, the New Order banned more than one hundred left-wing
mystical organizations, including those linked to the Communist Party or openly anti-
Islamic in their ideology." There were two reasons for this, one, to placate demands from
the Islamic community that spiritual groups be banned, since many in the Muslim
community considered these groups to be falsely guided. The second reason was that
"the policy had the welcome effect of making the remaining Javanist organizations
dependent on regime protection." 37 This dependence continued throughout the regime's
history, only to be strengthened in 198538 with the requirement that organizations
formally pledge allegiance to the Indonesian state by making Pancasila their charter, as
mentioned. Without this pledge, organizations would not be able to continue their
activities unhindered.





Yet even after pledging allegiance in this way spiritual groups were not left alone.
In 1988 Suharto stated that mysticism could not take the place of religion, and instructed
spiritual groups to return to their "agama induk," or mother religion. 39 "Some [mystical
organizations] began to identify themselves as Islamic and to define their mystical
practice as personal 'belief within Islam, not an alternative 'religion'."40 Further
constriction of spiritual groups occurred in 1989 when the BKKI refused to accept a
chairman chosen for them by the regime. Disasterously, "after 1989 they were never
again allowed to hold a national congress, and their already limited influence in
government circles declined precipitously." 4 ' After repressing Islamic organizations for
roughly twenty years, in the late 1980s Suharto began to cultivate a regimist kind of
Islam by granting more space for Islamic groups. The Association of Indonesian Muslim
Scholars (ICMI), formed in 1990, was an example of this regimist Islam.42 The
instruction to spiritual practitioners to return to their "mother religion" can be seen as one
of Suharto's attempts to curry favor in Islamic organizations.
Islam and spiritual organizations, as well as other elements of civil society,
operated as best they could in this atmosphere of fickle authoritarianism. Niels Mulder
sees the SKK and BK5I, as well as other bureaucratic structures concerned with spiritual
groups, such as the Department of Education and Culture, as ways in which spiritual
groups were shaped into a legitimate movement. 43 Unlike Mulder, who understands this
as the strengthening of the position of spiritual groups in the state, I see this as the







framework of the state. While this does allow spiritual groups a measure of respectability,
ultimately it limits their freedom of expression, spiritual or otherwise. The BK5I and
SKK represent the beginning of the state's absolute position of oversight over spiritual
groups and the first time in which the state attempted to direct the varied voices of
spiritual groups into one choir, singing only Pancasila. The following section explores
government oversight represented by the inventory project on spiritual groups conducted
by the Department of Education and Culture. After detailing the parameters and goals of
the inventory project, I give a history of the organizations Pangestu and Sumarah and
then an analysis of the government's discourse regarding these groups.
The Project
The inventory project of the Department of Education and Culture was a survey
of spiritual groups that, according to the title of the project, were dedicated to the deep
understanding of the One Supreme God. Entitled "Study of the Glorious Values of
National Spiritual Culture"" and called an "inventory" (inventarisasi), the project was
quite extensive. From what I can gather in the collection of the University of Michigan
Library, it lasted for at least two decades, from 1980 to 2000. The vast majority of the
reports, representing 150 groups inventoried, come from 1990 - 2000. From 1990 to
1994, 82 groups were inventoried, and from 1995 to 2000, 68 groups were inventoried.
Interestingly, even though this was quite clearly a New Order project, it did not end in
1998 with the New Order.
The inventory project is organized by province and produced in small volumes of
roughly 150 pages each. One volume typically discusses five groups, although some
"The Indonesian title is Pengkajian Nilai-Nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa.
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groups have been catalogued in their own separate volumes. The research was carried
out by individuals working under the auspices of regional Departments of Education and
Culture. In some volumes, the researchers are listed; in others, only the main editor's
name is included. The editors, whose names are listed in the appendix, appear to be
mostly bureaucrats within the Department of Education or the Department of Culture and
Tourism. Some are academics, such as Usman Pelly, who edited one volume on the
North Sumatran group Ugamo Malim, and is a professor of anthropology at the
University of North Sumatra. Maskan, the editor of the volume I analyze, is currently
part of the office of the General Directorate General for History and Pre-History (Sejarah
dan Purbakala) within the Department of Education.
Despite the diversity in authorship, nearly identical introduction and conclusion
sections in the volumes frame the inventory in a way that diminishes a sense of individual
authorship and locates the project as the product of an impersonal state. At the risk of
overemphasizing the state and underemphasizing the role individuals play in the
production of state power and discourse, throughout this discussion I will refer to the
collective authors of the inventory project as "the state" or alternately as the "Department
of Education and Culture." For the sake of simplicity, and because of the strong statist,
ideological content of these inventory reports, I will not refer to individual authors. I am
aware, and would remind readers, that abstractions such as "the state" cannot act except
through the people that make them up.
A statistical breakdown of the inventory project from the sources available to me
is as follows. A total of 164 spiritual groups were inventoried. Most of them originate in
Java; the other provinces represented are North Sumatra, Lampung, North Sulawesi, Bali,
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and Nusa Tenggara Timur. In North Sumatra, a total of eight groups were studied, one in
1986/1987, five in 1990/1991 and five in 1992/1993, three of which had been previously
studied. Two of the groups that were studied in 1992/1993 were studied again in
1999/2000. In Lampung, five groups were studied in 1991/1992, one of which was
studied again in 1997/1998. In North Sulawesi, ten groups were studied, five in
1988/1989 and five in 1991/1992. In Nusa Tenggara Timur, four groups were studied in
1992/1993. Finally, in Bali two different groups were studied in two different years,
1997/1998 and 1999/2000. The rest of the groups are Javanese, thus only 29 of the 164
groups are non-Javanese. An inventory of one group did not include its region, and one
group was listed as being from both Central Java and East Java. Excluding the un-located
group, we can count 134 groups from Java. Of these 134, one group is from both Central
and East Java, Jakarta and West Java has 14 groups; Yogyakarta, 34; Central Java, 40;
and East Java, 45. Yogyakarta and Central Java, geographically the same region but
administratively separate, have a combined total of 74, overwhelmingly more than the
other regions. This is an example of cultural privileging these areas enjoyed in the
nation. Many Javanese groups are titled in Javanese and some have extensive written
documentation in Javanese. Non-Javanese groups as well tend to use their local language
for their titles. Others, both non-Javanese and Javanese, reveal a more national identity
through their names, such as "Association for Indonesian Identity" (Perhimpunan
Kepribadian Indonesia) from Blora, Central Java, surveyed in 1998/1999. See the
appendix for a full listing of spiritual groups in the inventory reports.
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, what the government reports call
kelompok penghayat kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, I have termed
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"spiritual groups." The Indonesian translates completely as: groups of practitioners of
the belief in the One Supreme God." I have chosen the name "spiritual groups" because
the groups have, in general, spiritual, mystical, or even religious, goal and practices.
Most claim divine inspiration but do not, in the government inventory at least, declare
themselves to be religions. To repeat the government's titling of these groups I believe
would be uncritical, for while the government sees them as practitioners of the belief in
the One Supreme God, I believe they might be something else entirely. Without further
research I cannot sustain a positive definition for what they are, but I do not want to
uncritically repeat what I see as the state's move to contain these groups within its
ideological framework.
Repeating the government's name for these groups would also be a re-inscription
of state ideology. In the inventory project, this Pancasila phrase plays an important role
that will be discussed in depth. The embedding of the Pancasila formulation of Supreme
monotheism is one of the ways in which the state asserts its ideology as superior and also
restricts the idiom of spiritual language to an idiom of the state.
Although the inventory project was extensive and long-lived, it did not catalogue
every spiritual group active in Indonesia, nor was this its apparent intention. Rather,
most reports give the number of known organizations in the region, and of those, the
report focuses on five for discussion. The excluded organizations are not even listed by
name. For example, the 1991-1992 East Java publication notes 80 organizations in East
Java, of which five are studied. The 1989-1990 Jakarta and West Java publication
similarly notes 30 organizations in Jakarta and five organizations in West Java; it
catalogues four organizations from Jakarta and one from West Java.
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The East Java publication explains why it chose those, particular groups for
inclusion, and this provides an important key to understand one of the state's goals for the
project. The groups were chosen because they had: written teachings, an explanation of
spiritual culture, a significant number of members, an accessible location, and elders who
communicate well. 45 The criteria show that rather than an attempt to catalogue every
spiritual organization and mystical teacher of Indonesia, this project~legitimizes certain
groups as appropriate representatives of national spiritual culture. Those that are
inventoried are validated, those omitted are not. Interestingly, written texts or Scripture,
among other requirements, is an element of the legal definition for a religion in the
Indonesian state. As previously discussed, the state denied the status of religion to these
groups in 1961. Yet in this inventory project similar standards for validity are still
projected for spiritual groups. Validation and also privileging at the expense of other
spiritual groups through these reports is a parallel move to the suppression practiced by
Pakem. The reports in the aggregate create a composite model for spiritual organizations
promoted by the government; read individually, the reports provide a template for other
groups, holding up particular examples as appropriate models for spiritual expression.
Organizations whose elders don't "communicate well" and don't have written teachings
are excluded from the constitution of national identity and thus do not possess glorious
values that make up the spiritual identity of the nation. Through inventory, the state
attempted to narrowly define the field for appropriate spiritual expression and national
identity.
Privileging certain groups as-representatives of national identity is one goal of the
inventory project. The groups are framed as representatives of national,identity and are
45Pertiwintoro, ed., Pengkajian Nilai-nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa Daerah Jawa Timur vol 1, 8.
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presented as caretakers of cultural inheritance and cultivators of native science. Another
goal of the inventory project is to document the expression of native science and cultural
inheritance. These spiritual groups are claimed as "spiritual capital" for correct
manifestation of Pancasila and the Constitution. 46 The idea of cultural inheritance and
the indigenous is not reserved for spiritual groups. John Pemberton, in his study on the
enmeshing of culture in politics during the late New Order On the Subject of "Java"
notes that the language of "cultural inheritance" and "authenticity" are important
catchphrases of Suharto's government and make up "a rhetoric of culture" that "enframes
political will, delineates horizons of power."47 An advantage of this rhetoric is that, if
believed, it makes political power unquestionable. Culture, everyone agrees, is honorable
and good. When "culture" becomes a guise for political control, does political control
become good as well?
In the inventory project, native science and cultural inheritance are made to reveal
the unshakeable centrality of Pancasila. As discussed in the previous section, the
centrality of Pancasila as a symbol for the New Order should not be underestimated. The
establishment of Pancasila, which symbolically refers to the state, as original source of
spiritual values and determinant of cultural inheritance is at the heart of the inventory's
discourse on spiritual groups. The writing of the inventory displaces any other God that
might have been present and embeds Pancasila's One Supreme God. In this way, the
New Order project to inventory spiritual groups can be seen as a containment of possible
movements that might appear to be dedicated to a source other than New Order power.
46 Maskan, ed., Pengkajian Nilai-nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa, Jakarta dan Jawa Barat
1989/1990, 12.
47 John Pemberton, On the Subject of "Java, " 9.
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Documenting spiritual values was a part of New Order nation- and nationalism-
building. Materials of the inventory project were intended to have an active role in
society, teaching citizens to understand particular spiritual qualities as native science,
wisdom that comes directly from "bumi Nusantara" and is rooted in the souls of
Indonesians since bygone eras.48 According to the project, these qualities still exist
despite the many foreign influences that have left their mark on Indonesia. They are also
essential for the important work of developing Indonesia into a modern nation and
Indonesian into modern people. A quote reveals this goal quite clearly:
by defending and cultivating [national] cultural identity with a firm attitude, we want to reach the
ideal of developing a modern society that is able to live in a modern environment, with a modern
temperament and that is prepared to use modern technology, but without loss of our own national
identity. 49
This project thus intends to define national culture and national identity in a constructive
way, in order to use this national culture to create a society that is at once modern and
indigenous.
The tension between modernity and native-ness can be felt clearly here, and the
documents emphasize a drive towards a modern understanding of spiritual groups and
spiritual behavior. This can be seen in the descriptions of spiritual groups, which will be
discussed later, but also appears in the introductory section, making clear from the
beginning the importance of a modern Indonesian mindset. Cultures must change, and
they must change to support development in the present era. This study presents itself as
part of a process to re-understand values in such a way that they support the modern
nation-state of Indonesia. It is, in fact not the process of re-understanding by the process
48 Maskan, 12.
49 Ibid., 3. The Indonesian reads: "dengan mempertahankan dan memupuk kepribadian budaya dengan
sikap yang mantap, kita ingin mencapai cita-cita untuk membangun masyarakat moderen yang mampu
hidup dalam suasana moderen, dengan watak moderen dan sanggup pula menggunakan teknologi
moderen, namun tanpa kehilangan kepribadian bangsa sendiri."
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of formation of modern Indonesian national values. "The study of noble values is hoped
to become a reference for modification of each form of traditional culture that still lives
in society so that it can always develop with the demands of the era."50 In order to be
modern, cultures must change, yet the noble culture of Indonesia must not be lost due to
foreign (and less noble, undoubtedly) influences. The tension is clear. Indonesian
identity is unique (it is the most noble), yet Indonesian culture must also share similarities
with other nations (it must be modern).
In a discussion of Indonesian language ideology, Webb Keane has noted a similar
tension. He argues that Indonesian is understood as a central part of Indonesian "national
self-creation"5 1 and that the language "makes two claims to universality that reflect the
claims of modernist nationalisms more broadly." Indonesian should be a "medium for
the projection and fostering of a persona suitable for speaking in a public and for
identification with the nation." (It should be unique enough to be identifiable as
Indonesian.) "And it should take a recognizable place in the cosmopolitan plane of other
languages understood to be modern.",2 I argue that Indonesian spiritual culture, like
Indonesian language, as shown in Keane's argument, must be both uniquely identifiable
as native and as modern.
The inventory project works to make certain spiritual figures into representatives
of national culture and to produce and enforce ideas of nationalism and a national identity
using two foundational assumptions. The first is the assumption of iterability that allows.
5 Ibid., 4. The Indonesian reads: "Pengkajian nilai-nilai luhur diharapkan dapat menjadi acuan untuk
memodifikasi tiap bentuk kebudayaan tradisional yang masih hidup di dalam masyarakat sehingga selalu
dapat berkembang sesuai dengan tuntutan jaman."
51 Webb Keane, "Public Speaking: On Indonesian as the Language of the Nation" Public Culture vol. 15,




an inventory. The second is the assumption of the universality of religion. The act of
inventorying marks spiritual organizations as unique examples of the same phenomenon.
These groups are all exemplars of monotheism, which is a major part of state ideology.
The state pays lip service to uniqueness, stating that every group has its particularities, its
distinctive features (ciri khas). Yet unlike particularity, ciri khas denotes iterability: a
difference that becomes sameness since everything is understood to have that difference
which can be termed ciri khas. In the inventory, the individual example is a
representation of a general category. Ciri khas in this way allows categorization and
inventorying, reducing a science, a worldview, a way of being to an assigned number:
Paguyuban Ngesti Tunggal, I.079/F.3/N.1.1/1980.53
In discussing Jakarta's "Beautiful Indonesia" Miniature Theme Park, John
Pemberton notes a similar construction of diversity into similarity. He sees the
representation of cultures in the park as a move on the part of the state of "dedicated,
unitary recuperation of difference within a representational framework of the local."54 So
too the project of inventorying spiritual groups is a way to recuperate difference - of
cosmology, of theology, of ethics, and possibly, dangerously, of politics - into one
framework. In this case, the framework is not "the local" but "ciri khas," which
ironically leads to unity within the state.
By treating these spiritual groups as individual manifestations of a general idea,
the Indonesian state is also working from a thoroughly modern view of religion as a
universal, general category. Clifford Geertz, in his The Interpretation of Cultures, works




phenomenon and specifies that all religions share certain characteristics, such as
employing a set of symbols and establishing a certain realistic sense of order of
existence.55 This definition of religion has been influential in the framing of religious
behavior within anthropological studies and has been extensively criticized by Talal Asad
in his Genealogies of Religion.56 Tomoko Masuzawa further provides an important
analysis of the universality of religion as it has come to be understood in the present era.
In her book The Invention of World Religions she historicizes the concept of "world
religions" and the way in which religion has come to be understood as a "unique sphere
of life," in other words, a universal phenomenon to be found wherever life is.57
Masuzawa and Asad help to reveal the assumptions inherent in Geertz's definition of
religion.
A detailed understanding of the assumption of religious universality is important
for viewing the religious discourse of the Indonesian state. Masuzawa explains the
uncritical but popular contemporary assumption that "all religions are everywhere the
same in essence, divergent and particular only in their ethnic, national, or racial
expression"5" and discusses this assumption which is at large in Western universities.
The assumption is shared by the New Order state and provided the basis for the inventory
project: that there is something fundamentally similar about these groups, and they can be
seen best in relief with one another, which brings out not only their fundamental
sameness to one another and to the ideology of the state, but also their relative and less
important peculiarities.
S Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 90.
56 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam.




Masuzawa traces the history of religious universality by examining the writings of
Ernst Troeltsch, an 18h century German theologian-historian, who believed that
"everywhere the basic reality of religion is the same: an underivable, purely positive,
again and again experienced contact with the Deity." 59 Troeltsch and the New Order
state seem to have worked from shared assumptions. Through its inscription of
monotheism, the New Order re-inscribed religion as the same, and the reality of the Deity
as the same and singular, the Deity of the Indonesian state. While spiritual groups in
Indonesia never achieved legal status as religions, they were very clearly, from the state's
point of view, dedicated to the worship of the Deity. In this way they were included in
the universality of religious expression even as they were excluded from formal
authoritative status as distinct religions. The similarity between Troeltsch and the
intellectuals he represents and the New Order state is important to remember to avoid
treating the monotheism of the Indonesian state as a species apart. Indonesia is in line
with contemporary religious scholars whose ideology, as described by Masuzawa,
promotes.the universality and commonality of all religious expression and feelings. 60
The New Order is not an outlier in its views on religion, if it does take things a step
farther than other governments through its policies.
The Department of Education and Culture's inventory discursively projected
control over spiritual expression, writing state ideology into various and discrete spiritual
groups or religious movements. This was an attempt to make a wide array of spiritual
groups and their practitioners fit into a narrow ideological field of expression. The state
required that all spiritual expression or worship be dedicated to God in the state's terms
59 Troeltsch qtd. Masuzawa, 315.
60 Masuzawa, 317.
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(Tuhan Yang Maha Esa) and thereby, the state's definition of God. Spiritual ideology is
state ideology as the Department of Education and Culture restricted spiritual expression
to the idiom of Pancasila. With the inventory project, the state intended to enforce a
definition of national identity and national culture that is both native (distinct,
autonomous) and modern (worldly, universal). It did so by using a modern
understanding of religion and spiritual behavior as universal and by defining the groups
as iterable examples of a general category.
The Organizations
Pangestu History and Description
The founder of Pangestu1 was Raden Soenarto Mertowardojo, born in Boyolali,
near Surakarta in Central Java, in 1899. The government document describes R.
Soenarto as pious despite suffering a hard life. Since he was young, he trained in various
ascetic practices (tapa brata).62 Another source, Sularso Sopater's Mengenal Ajaran-
Ajaran Pangestu, describes R. Soenarto as having a "religious disposition, nature, and
attitude",from childhood.63 An example of his piety was a "pepadang" (lighting up,
enlightenment) in his heart which occurred when he was faced with marrying a woman
who was chosen for him by his parents. Although he did not want to marry her, he knew,
on the basis of this pepadang, that he must "obey the wishes of his parents."64 He
married Nona Soemini in 1921.
61 The acronym for Paguyuban Ngesti Tunggal, Pangestu, is a play on words. Pangestu, in Javanese, means
blessing or prayer.
62 Maskan, 14.




A significant step in R. Soenarto's life ocurred when he realized that the various
spiritual and ascetic teachings he had been learning would not lead him to the right place.
Sopater's study describes how R. Soenarto decided to forget all the teachings that he had
studied up until that point, "all the secret teachings (ilmu klenik) of various holy teachers"
and to stop believing in "strange things. Only one thing he held tightly, the belief in the
One Supreme God and that belief he nourished more and more."65 After coming to the
realization that all he needed was total belief in the One God, R. Soenarto received divine
inspiration. In a state between existence and nonexistence, in "increasingly ecstatic
devotion" ("kekhusyukan yang makin meningkat") he received a "wahyu66 of divine
enlightenment" which was divine speech (sabda) in his heart (pusat sanubari). This
occurred in 1932.67
The source of the wahyu was Suksma Kawekas, which translates rather clumsily
to the Absolute (Immaterial) Spirit or the Immaterial God, through the intermediary of
Suksma Sejati, the True (or Real) Immaterial. Suksma Sejati is also called a Guide and
Teacher for all humanity and Sang Guru Sejati, the True Teacher, and exists in the holy
inner core (pusat sanubari suci) of every person. The divine word received through
enlightenment contained three messages: one, that true knowledge is the truth about the
right path towards the source (asal) and the goal of life; two, statements about who
Suksma Sejati and Suksma Kawekas are; and three, that there will be two people sent to
R. Soenarto to help him. These people will write. down the commands of Suksma Sejati as
65 Sopater, 22. The Indonesian is: "segala ilmu klenik ajaran berbagai 'kya guru' tersebut, dan beliau
tidak mau percaya lagi akan hal-hal yang aneh. Hanya satu yang beliau pegang teguh-teguh yaitu percaya
kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa dan kepercayaan itu beliau pupuk semakin kuat."
66 Wahyu is a sign from the Heavens in the form of a star which falls on one destined for power or kingship;
it is power that is visible; it is also radiant light emanating from one's person that indicates reception or




R. Soenarto receives them. The two people were Raden Tumenggung Hardjoprakosa (d.
1942) and Raden Trihardono (d. 1958). R. Soenarto did not know these two people at the
time he received the divine message.
As it turned out, R. T. Hardjoprakosa and R. Trihardono visited R. Soenarto two
months after he received that wahyu. R. Soenarto continued to receive wahyu for the
next seven months, and R. T. Hardjoprakosa and R. Trihardono wrote them all down.
These were collected into seven volumes and compiled into one book called Sasangkan
Jati in 1954. Until 1949, the group was not structured as an organization. In that year,
while R. Soenarto was teaching, Sang Guru Sejati spoke to him again and told him that
the students must organize themselves into a group. Thus Paguyuban Ngesti Tunggal
was formed in order to "organize those who demand lessons from Sang Guru Sejati with
the main learning materials from the book Sasangka Jati."6 8
Harun Hadiwijono provides a full description of the cosmology, theology, and
genesis story of Pangestu's beliefs, This description concurs with that of the Department
of Education and Culture report and also with that of Paul Stange.69 Hadiwijono notes
that Pangestu's ideas of God are outwardly Islamic and also significantly draw on
Christian and Hindu traditions; for this reason he defines the organization as unparalleled
syncretism. According to Pangestu, God is Absolute, but is also three parts, Tri Purusa,
which is made up of Suksma Kawekas, Suksma Sejati, and Roh Suci. These are not
separate but are facets of the One. This finely-tuned theological formulation is flattened
68 Ibid.19.
69 Paul Stange, "'Legitimate' Mysticism in Indonesia," 95-96.
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in government discourse, which melds all possible names, facets, and nuances of the
Divine into the "One Supreme God." 70
Hadiwijono also details the moral values and moral qualities that a person must
have according to Pangestu; these in general agree with the description in the government
report. Moral values are expressed as the tri sila, which are awareness (eling), belief
(pracaya), and obedience (mituhu). He provides, helpfully, a rather long description of
the concept budiluhur. In essence, it means, he concludes, to "live in accordance with
attributes of the Exalted God." 71
The government publication makes no attempt at historicizing the founding story
of Pangestu. This omission will be analyzed more fully in the following section, but at
this point it is important to point out that the years that are mentioned in the government
text mark significant time periods in Indonesian history. In 1932, when Soenarto first
received the wahyu, Indonesian was still a Dutch colony and the independence movement
was experiencing more repression than it had previously. Nationalists were increasingly
frustrated with the colonial administration and the limited opportunities available to them.
In 1949,when Pangestu formed into a formal organization, Indonesia had declared its
independence from the Dutch but was still internally searching for political unity and
territorial integrity. Also in 1949, Dutch restrictions on native organization had been
lifted and were no longer a barrier to Pangestu's formal organization. In 1954, when the
teachings of Sang Guru Sejati were compiled into one book, Indonesia was solidifying
itself as a national entity and the central government, under Sukarno, was trying to
integrate all its territories and put down armed regional rebellions. Pancasila had been
70 Harun Hadiwijono, Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism, 196-230.
71 Ibid., 223.
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declared by Sukarno in a speech in 1945 and soon after that was taken as the national
philosophy, although it was not treated as state ideology until the Suharto years.
Sumarah
The founder of Sumarah, Raden Ngabehi Soekinohartono, first understood the
"demand for submission" (tuntunan Sumarah) not much later that the reception of the
first wahyu by R. Soenarto of Pangestu. R. Ng. Kino, a member of the Jogjakarta court,
was born in 1887 and died in 1971. Both R. Soenarto and R. Ng. Kino were influenced
by Hardopusoro, a late colonial era group that Paul Stange defines as a "Javanist adjunct
to the [Dutch] Theosophical Society" and a "slightly modernized form for Javanist
practices" 72
R. Ng. Kino understood the terrible condition of being colonized and was deeply
troubled when independence movement leaders were captured, killed, or imprisoned in
the early 1930s. He had strong ideas about Indonesia as a future national entity, thus
Indonesia as a national entity was always important for the Sumarah movement. He was
very diligent in ascetic practices, and because of his diligence he was able to receive the
demand for submission. R. Ng. Kino possessed "ilmu warisan," inherited knowledge,
which was "ilmu kedigdayan," knowledge of invulnerability. 73 But this ilmu, it turned
out, didn't provide what he was looking for. This knowledge, he decides, could not bring
"happiness and salvation in this life and the next" and so he started searching for
something else that could. 74
72 Paul Stange, The Sumarah Movement in Javanese Mysticism, 70-71.
7 Maskan, 22-23.
74 Ibid., 23. The Indonesian phrase is: "kebahagiaan dan keselamatan dunia akhirat."
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R. Ng. Kino prayed, meditated (tafakur), and "ponder[ed], fe[lt], and
remember[ed] signs" that he received. 75 Compared to R. Soenarto's point of contact with
the divine between existence and nonexistence, "pondering," with its connotations of
intellectual, brain-centered activity to understand the demands of the divine, is practically
a secular way to receive divine guidance. By this kind of pondering and prayer, R. Ng.
Kino became a warana, a screen on which true teachings from their original source can
be displayed. 76 In this usage of warana, a clear distinction between human and divine is
implied, and R. Ng. Kino was careful to underline the fact that he as a person was not
divine in any way. The division between divine and human and the need for intellectual
thought and reflection on divine commands reveal a quite modern concept of spirituality.
Submission is the name of the game in Sumarah, and it is important to note that
sumarah in Javanese, like islam in Arabic, means submission. The goal of Sumarah is
for humanity to have complete faith in God and to submit totally to God.77 R. Ng. Kino
guides followers to that state of total submission, the demand for which comes directly
from the One Supreme God. Sumarah has two texts to aid practitioners, but they do not
consider these texts holy. 78 Compared to Pangestu, the straightforward logic of Sumarah
is notable.
At the risk of providing a lop-sided analysis, a brief overview of Paul Stange's
scholarship on Sumarah will be helpful to evaluate the government discourse in the
inventory reports. Unfortunately, no secondary source comparable to Stange's study
75 Ibid., 24. The Indonesian reads: "merenung, merasakan dan mengenang kembali petunjuk-petunjuk."
76 Warana is translated by Paul Stange in his description of Sumarah as "screen" and occasionally
"vehicle." Another definition given by Stuart Robson and Singgih Wibisono's Javanese English
Dictionary is intermediary or representative.
7 Maskan, 24. The Indonesian reads: "Jadi tuntunan sumarah itu diperuntukkan bagi ummat manusia,
agar ummat manusia kembali ber-Iman Bulat kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa."
78 Ibid., 26. The texts are Sasanggeman and Himpunan Wewarah.
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exists for Pangestu. Stange's description paints Sumarah as an intensely national
organization in that the founder's initial inspiration was wrapped up with the idea of
Indonesian nationalism. The organization has, since independence, involved itself in
national politics and national structures. He also shows how the organization is deeply
rooted in Islamic monotheism, modernism, and religious universalism. In many ways
these tendencies are in line with the state's desires revealed through its inventory of
spiritual groups. However, even with the modernist and nationalist bent of Sumarah, its
discourse is not the discourse of the state. Nationalism, in Sumarah's view, did not
require the totalizing framework of state ideology into which the discourse of the state
has placed it.
The nationalism of Sumarah is evident both prior to and since the revolution.
When R. Ng. Kino first received divine inspiration in 1935, he was meditating for the
goal of Indonesian independence from the Dutch. Stange describes numerous occasions
in which the founding members of Sumarah meditated for Indonesian autonomy, and that
they understood, before the fact, that the Japanese would come to Indonesia, eventually
leave, that Indonesia would then be an independent nation, and that Sukarno would be
president. In the revolutionary years, R. Ng. Kino sent a letter to Sukarno, asking him
how Sumarah could help, and Sukarno instructed him to formalize the organization for
full effectiveness. 79 Sumarah organized its youth, who were trained in the martial art
pencak-silat as a part of their meditation practice, into troops that served in the
revolution. 80
79 Paul Stange, The Sumarah Movement in Javanese Mysticism, 129.
o Ibid., 122.
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After the revolution, the nationalistic emphasis of the organization continued.
Stange quotes the organization's leader Surono in 1957 as saying that the "national
condition depend[s] on the progress of Sumarah." 81 This reveals the essential role
Sumarah fills in the nation, in Surono's perspective, and also the intense national concern
the members of Sumarah felt, and the connection they perceived between their spiritual
practice and the well-being of the nation. Stange makes this perception a clear part of his
analysis. He notes that spiritual leaders have been a part of the nationalist movement as
much as anyone else and goes so far as to assert that "Every phase of Sumarah
development has been clearly and profoundly linked to the Indonesian national
progress." 82 Prior to independence, Sumarah leader R. Ng. Kino was committed to the
fight to end Dutch colonialism; in 1950, as Indonesian independence solidified, Sumarah
became a formal organization; and from 1950 through the New Order, Sumarah has
involved itself in national bureaucratic structures. While this does not, as Stange seems
to claim, indicate an existential link between Indonesia and Sumarah, it does show how
fully national Sumarah has been since its founding.
Bureaucratically, Sumarah itself took steps to contact the Department of
Education and Culture and thereby involve themselves in national bureaucratic
structures. 83 Later, in 1971, Sumarah joined the New Order organization for spiritual
groups, SKK, and even came to dominate SKK leadership positions. When eventually a
separate directorate was established for spiritual groups in the Deparment of Education





director general. 84 This directorate, under Arymurthy, originally undertook to inventory
spiritual groups, and quite likely, the 1989 document that serves as primary material for
my analysis is an outgrowth of Arymurthy's initial inventory project. 85 This clear
national involvement indicates to what degree Sumarah feels itself to be a "national"
organization. Yet it does not necessitate total endorsement of state ideology and politics.
Sumarah has kept itself away from specifically ideological positions, being independent
of political parties. 86 Its "public reputation of neutrality" strengthened its legitimacy for
the New Order. 87
Sumarah's teachings reveal both a specific kind of monotheism which can be
understood as Islamic as well as a modern understanding of religion as universal, similar
to that detailed by Clifford Geertz and analyzed by Tomoko Masuzawa. Evidence for
Sumarah's modernity, as cited by Stange, are R. Ng. Kino's overwhelming emphasis that
Sumarah teachings come directly from Hakiki, not from him; and his insistence that
spirits not collude with humans in the human world, but rather that each related directly
to God. Stange argues that this is a break from traditional Javanese and Javanese Sufi
practices and that it is essentially an Islamic modernist position.8 It is also a modern
view of the meaning of agency.89
Yet rather than be reducible to an essentially Islamic or essentially modernist
position, Sumarah provides a unique understanding of authority that, as far as I can tell, is
84 Ibid., 259-260.
85 Stange, "'Legitimate' Mysticism in Indonesia," 91.
86 Stange, The Sumarah Movement, 130.
" Ibid., 252.
88 Ibid., 91.
89 In his article "Public Speaking: On Indonesian as the Language of the Nation," Webb Keane notes on
page 519 that one central precept of modernism is that "humans can and must make their own destiny."
When this precept is applied to spiritual practice, it follows that each human must independently and
actively seek to relate to God and that no one person can ensure the salvation of another. Modernity makes
humanity more than ever unique responsible for the afterlife.
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neither modern nor traditional. Authority in Sumarah lies in collective group meditating
that leads to consensus. The consensus is based on God's will which can only be
established definitively through agreement found in group meditation.90 Another break
from Islam is that the Sesanggeman, the written teachings from R. Ng. Kino, stress that
there is only one Truth underlying all religions. While many modern Muslims may
personally feel this is so, it is not an Islamic position per se, which would require belief in
the perfection of Islam over all other faiths and Muhammad as the last of the prophets.
With the modern universalist idea of one underlying religious truth, one of
Sumarah's goals is unity among faiths. 91 This universalist idea of religion is shared by
Sumarah and the Indonesian government in the inventory project. The commitment to
that one Truth (for Sumarah, through Hakiki), and "growing sensitivity to the
international climate and pressure to present'the nation in secular and modern terms"
inspired modern and national structures for Sumarah as an organization. 92
A final way in which Sumarah exhibits its modernity (and, possibly, its
acquiescence to repressive New Order politics) is the firm distinction drawn between
political -power and spiritual consciousness. This distinction is necessary to be a
"publicly legitimate organization" as well as to be a modern spiritual organization. 93
Although the history of Sumarah reveals an essential congruence between realms which
are now divided as spiritual and material - meditating, for example, and military action
during the revolution - during the New Order the division between power and spirituality





was made unequivocal. The distinction between spiritual and material is thoroughly
modern as well as it is politically safe.
The foregoing discussion of Sumarah emphasizes that nationalism and modernism
have been braided into Sumarah as an organization and as a worldview. This description
runs the risk of painting Sumarah as devoted not only to Indonesian nationalism but also
to Suharto's New Order. However, important distinctions between the discourses of the
state and of.Sumarah reveal that this is not so. Sumarah discourse, as represented by Paul
Stange in his study, illustrates that Sumarah did not conceive of itself in the way that the
state did, and shows that New Order discourse, try as it might, was not omnipotent. The
discursive difference Sumarah presents is a way in which Sumarah presents a challenge,
if passive, to state ideology.
This challenge comes in the concept of the Divine. In Stange's description, R.
Ng. Kino's revelations came from Hakiki. Stange defines it as the "term of reference for
the principle of direct guidance from God." 94 While Hakiki is used most consistently, the
term Hak95 is also used referring to the same thing. In Stange's description, it is unclear
if Hakiki, which can be translated as Reality, is a term for God or for a sort of angel or
intermediary, the Guru Sejati (True Teacher) that the government texts mention. The
lack of clarity is telling. Sumarah, it seems, does not use the God -> heavenly messenger
(angel) -> earthly messenger (prophet) format to which the Semitic religions have
accustomed us. Instead, Hakiki refers to an ineffable source that nevertheless gives
guidance if humans meditate long enough to unite with it. Hakiki is the source of true




the idea of God, it is not personalized like the idea of God ("the Father" or "the Judge")
rather it is abstracted, more similar to "Truth" or "Reality." This is significant because
the source of guidance, for Sumarah, is not the "One Supreme God," and thus Sumarah
teachings do not focus on or lead to the One Supreme God as they are made to do through
the discourse of the inventory project. Nor does the place of Hakiki in Sumarah discourse
emphasize the a priori importance of monotheism to spiritual life.
Harun Hadiwijono, writing on Sumarah in his Man in the Present Javanese
Mysticism, defines Sumarah's idea of God in the same terms as state discourse, but then
describes Hakiki as "an unexpected explosion of sound, such as a short-circuit" through
which one receives the word of God. 96 However, in Hadiwijono's analysis of Sumarah
teachings, the concept of the Divine appears to be closer to the state's ideal of the One
Supreme God than to Stange's description.
Hakiki, and Hak, of course, are not words without antecedents. Hak (from the
Arabic haq, truth) is one of the names for God in Islamic discourse. Hak and Hakiki
therefore carry very strong resonances of Islamic monotheism, or tauhid, and while these
words distance Sumarah from the state's principle of monotheism, they do bring it close
to an Islamic-leaning discursive world. In my reading of the government documents, I
concur with Stange that God does not have a very central place in Sumarah cosmology.
The nine realms97 that R. Ng. Kino is led through reveal a cosmology in which there is a
96 Harun Hadiwijono, Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism, 159.
97 Maskan, 26. These realms are: the realm of temptation (alam sasar atau goda); the plant realms (alam
tumbuh-tumbuhan); animal realm (alam kehewanan); realm of conscious humanity (alam sadar manusia or
alam jasmani-rohani); realm of souls carrying the body (alam rohani mengemban jasmani or mati ing
urip); realm of souls conscious of eternal life (alam rohani dalam sadar hidup kekal or urip ing urip);
realm of souls obeying authority (alam rohani patuh dalam purbawisesa or manut ing urip); realm of souls
leading to holy work (alam rohani mengantar tugas suci atau makarnya or jumeneng ing urip); and finally,
realm of souls in the shelter of The One Life (alam rohani dalam makna atau naungan Hidup Yang Esa or
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greater discursive emphasis on the internal level of a person, on the soul and what level
of the world the soul exists, and a diminished discursive importance of an external,
Absolute God. Khak (Truth, God) is no more emphasized than urip (life, the divine life
within). The cosmology is focused on living and embodying a particular kind of God-
consciousness within the individual. While this may be conventional for Javanese
mysticism and Sufi discourse, it does not allow the Indonesian state to fit Sumarah very
easily into its framework of the external One Supreme God. This cosmology may also
contravene the description of R. Ng. Kino as a modernist Muslim, but retain resonances
with mystical Javanese and some Sufi movements.
Another discursive difference between Sumarah and the state's presentation of
Sumarah is the idea of wahyu. Wahyu, common in Javanese history and mystical
thought, has varied meanings. As stated previously, it can mean kingship or great power
indicated by a falling light from the Heavens, or divine revelation (as in the Arabic wahy,
revelation) or guidance, or the radiant light that emanates from a person on whom wahyu
has fallen. In the case of these spiritual groups, wahyu is used to mean divine revelation.
A comparison between R. Ng. Kino's wahyu as described by Stange and in the
government documents reveals important differences in perception of human agency vis-
a-vis the Absolute. The government report presents the impetus to organize into a formal
organization in 1949 as wahyu in the form of an explicit command to R. Ng. Kino, as in,
God said: organize! And it happened. In Stange's portrayal, the achievement of formal
organization took time and the involvement of many people, and only came about after
much collective meditation on the correct way to proceed. The state portrays wahyu as
Khak ing urip). The nine realms, or martabat sanga in other Javanese Islamic (suluk) literature, have a long
history in mystical Islam, beginning in the 12 h century with Ibti Al 'Arabi.
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revelation of direct commands from God, while Stange describes that the wahyu R. Ng.
Kino received required human effort to interpret through meditation to find the correct
course of action. The "Wahyu Iman Suci" of R. Ng. Kino was experienced not as a
command, but as awareness of responsibility and at the same time, the power and
authority to bear that responsibility.98 This wahyu places power in the person of R. Ng.
Kino. The state's interpretation of wahyu focuses power solely within the One Supreme
God and dis-empowers human actors.
The conceptual differences between the state's description and Paul Stange's
description of Sumarah demonstrate that Sumarah, as fully intertwined as it is with the
establishment of Indonesian nationality, is not an uncritical participant in New Order
ideology. Nationalism, in Sumarah's case, cannot be conflated with full acceptance of
New Order indoctrination or state ideology.
The Discourse
This section provides an analysis of the 1989/1990 Department of Education and
Culture inventory report for the areas of Jakarta and West Java. The state has at least five
goals in writing state ideology into descriptions of the beliefs and teachings of spiritual
organizations. These goals are: 1) to facilitate modern monotheism in Indonesia as a
whole and in Indonesians as individuals; 2) to standardize understandings of religion and
spirituality; 3) to make spiritual/cultural behavior support the state; 4) to standardize
national culture; and 5) to show the Indonesian state as eternal, and therefore, permanent




Reading between the lines, the description of the way R. Soenarto received his
wahyu makes him seem like a Sufi. He focused all his energies into concentration on the
One Supreme God (perfect tauhid, realization of the Oneness of God) which brought him
into an altered state (antara jaga dan tiada, between awareness and nothingness9 9 ) and
into contact with the divine. The term tauhid is never used, but R. Soenarto is described
as intending to forget everything else he had learned and focus completely on his belief in
God. In doing so, he is totally engrossed in prayer and humbly devoted to God. In this
kind of devotion, which brings his first divine inspiration, he is performing intense
Islamic monotheism.
This monotheistic religious behavior is coupled with R. Soenarto's intention to
forget the many strange things he learned, which are defined as klenik. Klenik once
meant secret, or something to be kept a secret, but by the time of the New Order, it had
come to have derogatory overtones, denoting dangerous superstitious or magical
practices. The aversion to klenik portrays it as something at best impotent and at worst
fatally wrong. This portrayal echoes other debates in Java regarding modernist and
traditionalist Islam. Pangestu, then, is situated on the modernist side of the debate and
uses a modernist idiom to express spiritual devotion.
The anti-klenik stance of R. Soenarto and the dysfunction of R. Ng. Kino's "ilmu
kadigdayan" show a turn away from previous kinds of Javanese spiritual practices and a
turn toward a modern kind of monotheistic spiritualunderstanding, although the idea of
monotheism is much more emphasized in Sumarah than it is in Pangestu. Instead of
inherited Javanese ilmu, R. Ng. Kino learns that only through total submission to the one
God will Indonesia get out of the clutches of the Dutch. The idea of tauhid can be felt
99 Maskan, 17.
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here as well. Monotheism, arguably the most important principle of Islam, is also
essential to Sumarah. Instead of mysticism, the description of Sumarah reads like bare-
bones Islamic universalism. As an intermediary or warana, R. Ng. Kino is distinctly
human; he helps people submit to God, and he has no special power besides knowledge,
which he reached, not through an altered state like R. Soenarto, but through reflection,
pondering, and prayer.
In bringing attention to the modernist and Islamic resonances of R. Soenarto's and
R. Ng. Kino's devotion, I intend to point out how the statist discourse of the "One
Supreme God" can also be an Islamic discourse of tauhid. It is Islamic in a modernist
sense (there is no use for klenik, all one needs is faith in the one God) and it is also sufist
(approaching union with God in a state between existence and nonexistence and receiving
wahyu through contact with God) yet also becomes, explicitly, Pancasilaist. The state's
Pancasilaist discourse trumps the other two through its use of the formula the "One
Supreme God" and by doing so subsumes the modernist and sufist understandings within
it.
Another aspect of modernism, which might even be considered linguistic
secularization of spiritual behavior, is that Pangestu members refer to their meetings as
"going to school" (masuk gedung sekolah) because they attend to learn "knowledge of
the soul" (ilmu jiwa) and "faith" (keimanan).i00 Schools are a government institution par
excellance, closely connected with the development of the nation thus modern in that
sense. The idea that spiritual organizations exist in order to learn or that instruction is
needed to learn a general sort of faith is a modern idea of spiritual behavior. Faith has
become generalized and needs no specific object. The emphasis is on having faith, not
100 Ibid., 21.
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on having faith in God. To call one's spiritual practice "going to school" explicitly
locates it within the secular realm and only works in a world in which faith and
spirituality have been separated from religion proper. In these ways, Pangestu is modern
and monotheistic, state-oriented and Islamic-oriented.
In a later section of the government document, the teachings of all the spiritual
groups are summarized and generalized into three categories. By the very nature of
categorizing in this way, the scope of possible expression of these organizations is
limited. The three kinds of teachings available to the spiritual organizations are: 1) belief
in God the Creator and in the need for humanity to be close to God; 2) ways to get close
to God, belief in the eternal human soul, and unity with God; 3) the obligation to do good
deeds in the world and to perform one's social obligations. 10' The teachings clearly
emphasize the importance of monotheism and can be considered modern in that they are
divorced from the specifics of a particular religious tradition in order to support a
universal idea of religion and spirituality. However, there is a potentially radical aspect
to this that should not go overlooked. In respect to the second teaching, it appears as if
the Indonesian state has allowed the possibility of the Sufi idea of radical union between
humanity and God as a part of national spiritual culture. This is extremely significant to
remember when comparing Indonesia to other Islamic-majority countries. There is a
tendency in academia to oppose modernist Islam to Sufi Islam, and this modern state
understanding of Islam with Sufistic elements of union between human and God rejects
that opposition.102
01 Ibid., 39-40.
102 This also brings up questions of the place of Sufism in Islam and the relation of Sufism to the state.
Could Sufism at the time of the New Order be said to be marginalized if it had a place in New Order state
ideology? Is the state's action of writing Sufism into state ideology a form of co-optation? If so, does this
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Standardization of religious and spiritual understanding
Implicit in the inventory is an understanding of religion as a universal category,
with-one and the same God for all worshippers. This was touched upon briefly in the
previous section and discussion of ciri khas, which showed that the government, by
performing this inventory, has defined all of these varied organizations as individual
representations of a general category. Although the spiritual groups inventoried are not
legally considered religions, they support the identification of religion as a universal
category in that they promote non-denominational practices through which to reach the
universal (singular) God. Through this project, both the government and often the groups
themselves are participating in the making religion into a universal phenomenon.
From the perspective of a religious practitioner, this means that all religions and
spiritual groups are equal among themselves if not equal across categories. Religions are
equally valuable because they all teach the same truth, being, as they are, mundane
manifestations of a single Divinity. Spiritual groups are equal because they all teach
various ways to reach the same end, worship of the single Divinity. Pangestu represents
this universalist idea of religion and spirituality, understanding itself to be a particular
expression of the truth that all religions teach. This is empowering because it logically, if
not socially, gives Pangestu teachings the same weight in Indonesian society as Islamic
teachings; the Sabda that was received by R. Soenarto can be considered as valuable as
the Qur'an transmitted by the Prophet Muhammad. Yet at the same time it is
perniciously limiting. With this understanding, Pangestu will never be able to promote a
cosmological or theological understanding that is explicitly unique and possibly contrary
mean that Sufism in contemporary Indonesia provides support for, rather than protest against, the state?
Unfortunately it is outside of the scope of this paper to address these questions.
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to modern monotheism. With the conflation of nation, the New Order, and monotheism
in Pancasila ideology, it also means that Pangestu will never be able to promote an
understanding that contravenes the Indonesian state.
Neither Pangestu nor Sumarah consider themselves to be a religion, nor do they
consider differences in religion to be significant.
The differences of faith, according the Pangestu, are overshadowed by one objective similarity [to
other religions], which is the existence of the basis of the Supreme monotheism as incorporated in
the first basic principle of the Indonesian Republic. 10 3
This quote provides a strong example of how Pangestu and the Indonesian government
are together enacting a universalization of religion under the auspices of the Republic of
Indonesia. According to this statement, all spiritual orientations, including Pangestu,
have the same organizing principle, or "objective," which is also the same as Indonesian
state ideology. The promotion of religion and spirituality as universal phenomena further
brings individual spiritual organizations into the binds of state ideology.
Sumarah also focuses on monotheism rather than doctrinal particularity. Their
teachings focus on the practice of submission to God with scant explanation of what God
is. The divine message that led to the creation of Sumarah as an organization was simply
to return humanity to its perfect, complete faith in the One Supreme God. "The demand
of Sumarah is understood as forming spiritual guidance based on the proof-witness-truth
in performing worship of submission to the One Supreme God"'04 Sumarah further does
not use symbols or have a holy text, nor recognize one particular leader. It turns its
attention to the perfect practice of faith and leaves the question of faith in what for others
103 Maskan, 21-22. The Indonesian reads: "Namun perbedaan keimanan ini, menurut Pangestu, dinaungi
oleh satu persamaan obyektif, ialah adanya asas Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa sebagaimana tercantum
dalam sila pertama dasar negara Republik Indonesia."
104 Ibid., 25. The Indonesian reads: "Tuntunan Sumarah dihayati berupa bimbingan kerokhanian berazas
pada bukti-saksi-nyata dalam menjalankan ibadat sujud sumarah kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa."
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to answer, either as a way to exit the field of religious competition or to encompass all
competition within it. State ideology, of course, through New Order Pancasila discourse,
has jumped in to answer that question: faith in the One Supreme God, faith in Pancasila,
faith in the Republic of Indonesia. Sumarah, of course, does not worship the state.
Unfortunately, it is quite convenient for the state that Sumarah's discourse does focus so
explicitly on submission to God, and that the state and God are linked so tightly through
New Order Pancasilaist language. The state is thus able to present Sumarah as aligned
perfectly with its own ideology.
State-supporting religious/cultural behavior
In the previous section on monotheism, we saw that statist resonance trumped
both Islamic and Javanese resonances in Pangestu materials while at the same time
maintaining echoes of those meanings. In this section I will examine how state discourse
replaces, effaces, or subsumes other kinds of discourse. This is effectively accomplished
through translation.
At the time of his wahyu, R. Soenarto understood that Suksma Sejati was
transmitting a message to him that originated from Suksma Kawekas. In the inventory,
Suksma Kawekas is first explained as "God of all the realms" (Tuhan seru sekalian alam)
and Suksma Sejati is the "messenger of the Eternal God" (Utusan Tuhan yang abadi).10 5
This naming of the divine is immediately followed by a translation into the framework of
the state: "From the above statements we know that Pangestu is a spiritual organization
solely based on the Supreme Oneness of God (emphasis added). . ."106 The teachings of
105 Ibid., 17.
106 Ibid., 19. The Indonesian reads: "Dari pernyataan-pernyataan tersebut di atas dapat kita ketahui pula
bahwa Pangestu merupakan organisasi yang bersifat kejiwaan semata-mata berdasarkan Ketuhanan Yang
Maha Esa...
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Sang Guru Sejati, another name for Suksma Sejati, become the concept of the Supreme
Oneness of God, importing statist ideology into Pangestu teachings. This is repeated
through the statement of the goals of Pangestu, which were settled after they became a
formal organization. One major goal is to help its members "return to oneness with the
One Supreme God" through the teachings of Sang Guru Sejati.107 Suksma Kawekas has
been effaced, and the essential figure is God as discursively figured by the Indonesian
state. The, only place to which the teachings of Guru Sejati lead is Tuhan Yang Maha Esa,
the One Supreme God of the Indonesian state.
This goal is supported by a guide of ten individual items, called the dasasila,
(creating an echo of pancasila). The first item on this list is to worship the One Supreme
God; second is to worship the Messenger of God. After these predictable tenets, the third
principle is to be faithful to the head of the state and the nation's laws; the fourth is to
worship the homeland. Only after the homeland should one worship one's parents, older
siblings, teachers, and other living creatures.108 The dasasila were written as guiding
principles after Pangestu formed into an organization in 1949. Nationalist discourse, at
least in this dasasila if not all the teachings of Pangestu, runs strong and in this way,
nationalism is worked into spiritual practice.
For the inventory's Sumarah, Tuhan Yang Maha Esa has been present since the
beginning. When Indonesia was still a Dutch colony, R. Ng. Kino prayed to the One
Supreme God for Indonesian independence. The anachronism of this discourse ("Tuhan
Yang Maha Esa" did not discursively exist until the writing of Pancasila) will be
discussed later. At this point it is important to note that as written in government
107 Ibid., 20. The Indonesian reads: "kembali bertunggal dengan Tuhan Yang Maha Esa."
108 Ibid. Principles five through ten are as follows: worship one's parents; worship one's older siblings;
worship one's teacher; worship teachings of virtue; love all fellow humans; respect all religions.
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discourse, Sumarah was always dedicated to the submission to the One Supreme God as
figured in state ideology. It is the One Supreme God that replies yes, Indonesia will be
free. R. Ng. Kino also hears that he must help people to have total perfect faith in the
One Supreme God, and in this way it is as if R. Ng. Kino's task is to promote the
ideology of the state and perfect faith in that ideology. In just one paragraph, the statist
phrase "Tuhan Yang Maha Esa" is repeated six times. For example: ". . . belief in the
One Supreme God is not pure and not perpetuated; an unholy and fractured relationship.
People don't submit completely, don't worship and give up everything completely to the
One Supreme God." 109 In a later section in the report describing Sumarah's teachings,
the definition of God (in this case, expressed with the Javanese word Pangeran, meaning
Lord and God) is explained more fully. In that section, "Pangeran" becomes "Tuhan
Yang Maha Esa" every time a Sumarah sentence is translated from Javanese to
Indonesian. Being translated into Indonesian, apparently, means being translated into
state discourse." 0
Outside of the description of any particular organization, the government report
provides its own explanation of the nature of God. In this explanation, a series for names
for God in Javanese and in Indonesian are mentioned, with no particular context and no
explanation of where these names come from. This quote provides an example:
A religious living culture has been known by the Indonesian people for a long time, which means
that the practice of social life is always based on belief and faith in Dhat Kang Murba Ing Dumadi
(Jv., The Essence that Rules Creation), which is the Omnipotent God, God the Creator of the
Universe with all of its contents including humanity. Even though actually humanity is not able to
see the form of God or Gusti Kang Murbo Kawasa Jagad (Jv. The Lord that Rules the World),
109 Ibid., 23. The Indonesian reads: "... kepercayaan terhadap Tuhan yang Maha Esa tidak murni dan
tidak lestari, suatu hubungan yang kurang suci dan terputus-putus. Manusia tidak bersumarah sepenuhnya,
tidak menyembah dan menyerah sepenuhnya kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa."
110 Ibid., 73-74.
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every person is able to belief in the attributes of God the Most Perfect and Omnipotent over
everything in the world.1II
Directly following this discussion and summarizing it, the phrase "the One Supreme
God" takes over as marker for God and none of the other names are used. The following
paragraph begins: "Realizing that humanity is a creation of the One Supreme God,
humanity always wants to be close to God ... "112 Tuhan Yang Maha Esa serves as a
sign for all of those other names of God, effacing again their individual and specific
meanings.
Incorporating Pangestu and Sumarah completely into the state's ideological
framework is in part accomplished by pervasive repetition of set phrases such as "the One
Supreme God" to the exclusion of other possible discursive constructions. Translating
unique names for God (if not unique Gods) into the same phrase, while not necessarily
pervasive and repetitive, functions in the same way, which is to exclude or efface other
discursive constructions of God and institute one kind of spiritual/cultural model for
behavior. This is clearly the intent of the text. To what degree the text can be considered
successful depends on its reception by a national audience; analysis of what kind of
reception this inventory project has had through the years is regrettably beyond the scope
of this essay. These modernizing, standardizing, and inventorying actions of the New
Order must also be considered with other elements of the regime's dynamics;
specifically, the various mystical teachers and shamans (dhukun) with whom Suharto
Ibid., 36. The Indonesian reads: "Budaya hidup yang religius memang sudah dikenal oleh bangsa
Indonesia sejak dahulu, yang artinya bahwa penghayat hidup masyarakat selalu didasarkan pada
keyakinan dan kepercayaan pada Dhat Kang Murba Ing Dumadi, ialah Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa, Tuhan
Pencipta Alam Semesta dengan segala isinya termasuk manusia. Walaupun pada hakekatnya manusia
tidak sanggup melihat wujud Tuhan atau wujud Gusti Kang Murbo Kawasa Jagad, namun setiap orang
sanggup meyakini akan sifat Tuhan Yang Maha Sampurna dan Kuasa atas segala-gala di dunia ini."
112_Ibid., 37. The Indonesian reads: "Menyadari bahwa manusia adalah ciptaan Tuhan Yang Maha Esa,
manusia selalu ingin dekat dengan Tuhan..."
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surrounded himself. The New Order was by no means a monolithic or completely
modern regime.
Standardization of national culture
After the description of the spiritual groups, the inventory report discusses the
teachings of the groups. These teachings are under the heading "Sublime Values of
National Spiritual Culture" (Nilai-Nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa) and are divided
into three subgroups: teachings that contain elements of belief in the One Supreme God;
teachings that express the requirement to remember and worship (berbakti kepada) the
One Supreme God; and teachings that demand humanity to behave honorably within
society. This discursive framework places all of the.groups, despite any possible
differences, into one form - all groups have the same type of teachings and teach the
same thing. Further, the first two items that must be taught by these groups require the
organizing principle of belief in the state's. version of God. That is, one item that must be
taught by these groups is state ideology. Because the state ideology is enacted through
this "spiritual cultural" format, it standardizes national culture by setting the definitions
of what those cultural values are and the boundaries of how they can be interpreted.
As an introduction to the discussion of individual spiritual groups, the document
sets out a brief theology. Humans know they are created by God and thus they miss God
and look forward to return after death. Humans know they can return to God only by
being good in life. Being good means creating benefit for everyone, not just oneself. One
has to control his/her good and bad desires, senses, and will. Humanity thanks God for
revealing the right way, through religion or organizations for the belief in the One
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Supreme God.113 This is the theology of the state, and thus these are the values of the
Indonesian people. They must be inherent, then, in the teachings of these spiritual
cultural organizations.
In particular, there are two qualities taught by all the organizations: becik
sejatining becik (good that is truly good) and berbudi bawaleksana (following through on
one's words). Becik sejatining becik is explained as being good not only for oneself but
for others.as well, and berbudi bawaleksana is the quality of fulfilling one's promises and
putting words into actions. These two teachings will increase the awareness of
Indonesians in a "Pancasila-based national life." 114
Important to note is the Javanese ethical formulations and Javanese language used
to express the high values of the Indonesian nation. This is especially significant because
the inventory locale is West Java, where the local language would be Sundanese, not
Javanese. Pangestu and Sumarah started in Central Java but became national, with their
centers in Jakarta, which is a national city more than it is a Sundanese city, and are thus
included in the West 'Java and Jakarta area inventory. The Javanese terms show that
while particularities in the interpellation of God are effaced, certain Javanese ethical
mores are preserved and enforced as national culture. Select Javanese terms support the
presentation of these spiritual groups as containing and maintaining the seeds of pure
native science and lofty cultural values and are a way to delineate national culture,





Terms of spiritual enlightenment are maintained in Javanese. R. Soenarto
received pepadang, R. Ng. Kino is a warana. Other terms are those that dictate behavior
in society. One of the first lessons R. Soenarto learns is that he must mituhu or obey his
parents. This is an obvious example of a moral lesson the state would like to impress
upon its citizens. Other terms that enforce moral lessons are conventional Javanese ethics
such as: acceptance (rela, narima), honesty (temen), patience (sabar), and the elusive yet
ever present honorable quality, budi luhur. Other ethical ideas are expressed in
Indonesia, such as: dedication, dedicated service (pengabdian), and self-control
(pengendalian diri).'
15
A third set of terms refer particularly to acts or ways of worship. No matter the
type or target, worship is generally defined as "berbakti kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa."
Berbakti is Indonesian, and in some contexts it means to be loyal, to serve devotedly, and
in others it means to worship. This double meaning works well for the conflation of state
and spirituality: in a word, one can be loyal to the state and worship God. It does not
necessarily follow that being loyal to the state and worshipping God are the same action,
but possible slippage between the two is created. Other terms in Javanese used for
worship are: remember, be aware (eling), believe (pracaya, piyandel), obey (mituhu), and
pay homage (manembah).116
The Indonesian state as eternal: Ahistoricism and Anachronism
The Department of Education and Culture report records significant years for all
of the spiritual organizations catalogued, but never puts those years into their historical
context. This kind of ahistoricism allows a picture of the Indonesian state in its
1S Ibid., 58-61 and 88.
116 Ibid., 44.
62
contemporary form to be projected as eternal and timeless; as if it always existed and
always will, changelessly. As we have seen previously, the discourse is also
anachronistic.
Years are mentioned in background story of Pangestu (1932 first wahyu received,
1949 formally established as an organization, 1954 written works collected in one
volume) but no mention of the historical context was made, even though R. Soenarto and
Pangestu moved through extremely significant historical times, from the end of
colonialism through Japanese occupation to independence and Guided Democracy. This
is also true of the portrayal of Sumarah, which has a similar timeline to Pangestu.
Though there is mention of Dutch colonialism during R. Ng. Kino's youth, the story
skips, it seems, from Dutch presence to the timeless present of New Order Indonesia. It
is as if historical events happened somewhere else. The government document presents
Pangestu and Sumarah as not affected by history; this makes Indonesia appear and
timeless.
The anachronism of state discourse allows state ideology also to appear timeless.
In the discussion of Sumarah, perfect faith is defined as faith in the One Supreme God.
There is no alternative construction for the interpellation of God yet at the time of
Sumarah's founding, this phrase was- not in currency and there was no Pancasila. R. Ng.
Kino even prays to the "One Supreme God" so that Indonesia will be free from the
Dutch. 1 7 Likewise for Pangestu, Sang Guru Sejati spoke to Soenarto in 1932; Pancasila
and Indonesian independence were not declared until 1945, and the formulation of
Pancasila that included the phrase "Tuhan Yang Maha Esa" came about at that same
time. Besides emphasizing state ideology, this anachronistically writes state ideology
"m Ibid., 23.
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into the past where it (historically) didn't exist. By removing history, and time, from the
picture, the New Order conception of "Indonesia" becomes the only option ever possible.
Pemberton, in his analysis of culture in Java, notes the ahistoric tendency of the
New Order. He argues that ahistoricism in the promotion of traditional culture is a way to
circumvent the ugly history of the origins of the New Order. "What appears to remain is
a purely tradisional culture free of political and historical implications, a culture
dedicated.to, as if by nature, its own celebration."" 8 Similarly, marking history and
politics out of the founding stories of the spiritual organizations, and the more than
seventy years of history since the first wahyu received, is also a circumvention of the
past, in such a way that anything that does not fit into the frame of "pure native science"
is effaced.
If the inventory study included a historical contextualization of these spiritual
groups, it would reveal examples of foreign influence such as the Dutch Theosophical
movement and political ideas of nationalism promoted at the time of independence.
Allowing these influences to be shown would reveal that the founders of the spiritual
organization lived in an international world. As much as they may have meditated on
mountaintops, they apparently drew from all resources available to them, from Javanese
mystical science to Western theories of national self-definition. Part of what makes these
organizations so interesting is their interpretation and combination of the various sciences
and influences to which they were exposed. The ahistoricism of the New Order
inventory flattens these influences, thereby reducing the scope of the spiritual
organizations and limiting the discursive space available to them. Limitation of these
18Pemberton, 15.
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groups' discursive spaces is, of course, dependent on the inventory project's actual
efficacy in national and spiritual life. One hopes its efficacy fell short of its mark.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion reveals five distinct areas in which the state has
discursively attempted to regulate spiritual behavior. Through a discourse of modern
monotheism, state ideology is shown to contain or subsume Islamic religious registers.
The standardization and universality of religion allows Pangestu and Sumarah to promote
spirituality and faith without a specific ideological register that would claim them as
unique unto themselves, unquantifiable, and incomparable with others. On the contrary,
they are represented as individual examples of a general idea, part of the universal
phenomena of religion and spirituality. Translation of spiritual ideas, names for-God, and
ideas of worship into the state's idiom is an imposition of spiritual forms that support the
state, and indeed, can do little but support the state. Further discussion of moral and
ethical behavior provides a standardization of national culture, which allows the state to
clearly delineate Indonesian spiritual identity, marking what belongs and effacing what
does not. Finally, a portrayal of the Indonesian state as eternal is attained through a lack
of attention to historical context and persistent anachrony, which inserts state ideology
prior to the existence of an independent Indonesia. All of these moves are ways in which
the state attempts to dominate discursive realms and impose its control over the intimate
relation between human and divine. The end goal of the state is the enforcement of New
Order Pancasila ideology as unequivocal.
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With statist consolidation in Soeharto's years came ideological nationalist
indoctrination and the institutionalization of religion in the government bureaucracy. The
push toward monotheistic, universal "world" religions was perhaps a modernizing move
supported by Soeharto's development plans for the nation. In this way, the New Order
was responding to an ideological doctrine of modernity which influenced New Order
Pancasila ideology. The program of national indoctrination of the ideology of Soeharto's
Pancasila state moved spirituality and nationalism closer than they ever were before, and
correspondingly restricted the breadth of meaning that both ideas could support.
Through its examination of New Order discourse on spiritual groups and national
ideology, this essay has attempted to address a particular example of the interaction
between spirituality and politics. I have shown not only that spirituality and politics do
interact, but that they do so extensively, and in ways that are mutually influential.
Sumarah and Pangestu are spiritual groups that saw themselves, at the time of their
founding, as explicitly nationalist and as contributing to the formation and definition of
the nation. In a later period, the groups continued to participate in bureaucratic
structures, and the New Order explicitly strove to direct spiritual expression and belief
into New Order-supporting forms. Spirituality and politics, rather than distinct areas of




List of spiritual groups inventoried
Pengkajian Nilai-Nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa
Hasil Penelitian Organisasi Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa.
1980-2000
Published by the Department of Education and Culture, Jakarta, Indonesia.
Note: Location names in bold font indicate that the volume includes multiple groups.
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1990-91 Angesti Sampurnaning Kautaman
Hangudi Bawanatata Lahir Bathin
Paguyuban Madri Santosaning Budi
Persatuan Warga Sapta Darma
Anggayuh Panglereming Napsu































Sumatera Utara Soeradi, Maskan
Jawa Timur Pertiwintoro
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36 Kepercayaan "Sapta Darma" Indonesia
37 Paguyuban Ngelmu Sangkan Paraning
Dumadi Sanggar Kencana
38 Paham Jiwa Dini Pribadi
(1) Badan Penghayat Kepercayaan
Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa
"Rila"
39 199 1-92 Keakraban Kekadangan Ngestu
Tunggal
40 Kawruh Guru Sejati Kawedar
41 Memayu Hayuning Bawono
42 Penembah Jati
43 Kawruh Sangkan Paran Kasampurnan
44 1991-92 Yayasan Sosrokartono
45 Paguyuban Sangkara Muda
46 Paguyuban Jati Luhur
47 Paguyuban Manunggaling Kawula
Gusti
48 Organisasi Imbal Wacono
(44) 199 1-92 Yayasan Sosrokartono
49 Paguyuban Mardi Santosaning Budi
(46) Paguyuban Jati Luhur
(24) Anggayuh Panglereming Nafsu
(48) Imbal Wacono
50 1991-92 Bumi Hantoro
51 Dharma Murti
52 Ilmu Goib Kodrat Alam
53 Paguyuban Pendidikan Ilmu
Kerohanian
54 Purwo Deksino
55 1991-92 Adat Musi
56 Masade
57 Empung Lokon Esa
58 Kalkikan
59 Sanga Lalan Rondor




(6) 1992-93 Ugamo Malim
64 Pijer Podi
65 Perpulungan Rumah Sipitu Ruang
(33) Purwa Madio Wasono
(34) Galih Puji Rahayu
66 1992-93 Bimo Suci'
67 Manunggaling Kawula Gusti
68 Hangudi Lakuning Urip
69 Persatuan Ekasing Budi Murko
70 Hak Sejati
71 1992-93 Paguyuban Kebatinan Imu Hak
72 Tri Sabdo Tunggal Indonesia
73 Pancaroba
74 Persatuan Warga Theosofi Indonesia









































1993-94 Persatuan Eklasing Budi Murko
Paguyuban Kebatinan Traju Mas
Yayasan PEKKRI Bondhan Kejawen
Paguyuban Hak Sejati
Paguyuban Bima Suci
Paguyuban Hangudi Lakuning Urip
1993-94 Angesti Sampurnaning Kautaman
Minggu Kliwon
Kasampurnan Jati
PEKKRI - Bondan Kejawan
Lepasing Budi-Luhuring Budi
1993-94 Paguyuban Ngesti Budi Sejati
DIY Pertiwintoro
DIY Suradi Hp
Jawa Timur . Gendro Nurhadi
87 Paguyuban Penghayat Kasampurnan
88 Paguyuban Pamungkas Jati Titi Jaya
Sampurna
89 Paguyuban Kepribadian Indonesia
90 Paguyuban Gunung Jati
91 Paguyuban Kawruh Kasampurnan
Kasunyatan Pusoko Budi Utomo
92 1994-95 Marsudi Kaluhuraning Budi (Mekar
Budi)
93 Perhimpunan Perikemanusiaan
94 Paguyuban Ki Ageng Selo
95 Buko Saliro Pribadi (BUSADI)
96 Kebatinan Satuan Rakyat Indonesia
97 Gayuh Urip Utami (GAUTAMI)
98 1995-96 Kejiwaan
99 Esa Tunggal Sejati (Satu Jati)
100 Manengku Husada Rasa Sejati
101 Badan Kebatinan Indonesia














1995-96 Kekadangan Wringin Seta
Wiratama Wedyananta Karya
(Wiweka)










Himpunan Murid dan Wakil Murid
Ilmu Sejati R. Prawiro Soedarso
Paguyuban Ngelmu Kasampurnan















115 Pirukunan Purwa Ayu Mardi Utama
116 Aliran Kebatinan Tak Bernama
117 Kawruh Sedulur Sejati
118 Perguruan Ilmu Jiwa
119 1995-96 Trisoka
120 Kebatinan Donojati
121 Kawruh Budi Hardo Pusoro
(85) Lepasing Budi Luhuring Budi
(83) Minggu Kliwon
(84) Kasampurnan Jati
122 1996-97 Kawruh Jendro Hayuningrat
Rahyuning Kautaman
123 Tri Murti Naluri Majapahit
124 Paguyuban Aliran Seni dan
Kepercayaan
125 Kaweruh Kasampurnan Sangkan Paran
Budhi Luhur
126 Purwane Dumadi Kautaman
Kasampurnan
127 Paguyuban Tuntunan Ilmu Kebatinan
"Sapta Sila"




Yogyakarta128 1996-97 Hidup Betul
129 1996-97 Kaweruh Jowo Dipo
130 1996-97 Kepribadian Sabdo Tunggal
131 1996-97 Paguyuban Among Raga Panggugah
Sukma
132 1996-97 Paguyuban Jaya Sempurno
133 1996-97 Paguyuban Ketuhanan Kasampurnan
134 1996-97 Paguyuban Pancasila
Handayaningratan
135 1996-97 Pangudi Rahayuning Bawana
136 1996-97 Sumarah Purbo
137 1996-97 Seserepan Kepribadian Intisari 45
138 1996-97 Pirukunan Kawula Manembah Gusti
139 1997-98 Paguyuban Hamesu Budi Lukitaning
Janma
140 Organisasi Kasampurnan Ketuhanan
Awal dan Akhir
141 Paguyuban Kawruh Batin Kasunyatan
Simbol 101
142 Organisasi Kebatinan 09 Pambuko
Jiwo
143 Organisasi Perguruan Ilmu Sejati
144 1997-98 Paguyuban Kawruh Bathin Kasunyatan
Simbol 101
(54) 1997-98 Purwo Dekseno












































































































Kebatinan 09 Pambuko Jiwo
Kawruh Urip Sejati
Kasunyatan Bimo Suci






























































































Asad, Talal. Genealogies of Religion Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity
and Islam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.
Bourchier, David and Vedi R. Hadiz. Indonesian Politics and Society A Reader. London:
Routledge Curzon, 2003.
Campbell, Bruce. Ancient Wisdom Revived A History of the Theosophical Movement.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
Geels, Antoon. Subud and the Javanese Mystical Tradition. Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997.
Geertz, Clifford. The Religion of Java. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960.
The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Hadiwijono, Harun. Man in the Present Javanese Mysticism. Baarn: Bosch & Keuning
N.V., 1967.
Hefner, Robert. Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
de Jong, Suffridus. Salah Satu Sikap Hidup Orang Jawa. Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 1976.
Kahin, George McTurnan. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1952.
Kartodirdjo, Sartono. "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development" in
Claire Holt, ed. Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.
Keane, Webb. "Public Speaking: On Indonesian as the Language of the Nation" in
Public Culture vol 15(3) 2003 pp 503-530.
"Knowing One's Place: National Language and the Idea of the Local in
Eastern Indonesia" in Cultural Anthropology vol 12(1) 1997 pp 37-63.
Larson, George D. Prelude to Revolution Palaces and Politics in Surakarta, 1912-1942.
Dordrecht Holland: Foris Publications, 1987.
Maskan, ed. Pengkajian Nilai-Nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa Wilayah DKI Jakarta
dan Propinsi Jawa Barat. Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1989/1990.
Tokoh Wongsonegoro. Jakarta: Badan Pengembangan Kebudayaan dan
Pariwisata, 2002.
Masuzawa, Tomoko. The Invention of World Religions Or, How European Universalism
was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2005.
72
McGregor, Katharine. History in Uniform Military Ideology and the Construction of
Indonesia's Past. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007.
Mulder, Niels. Mysticism in Java Ideology in Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2005.
Pemberton, John. On the Subject of "Java." Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Pertiwintoro, ed. Pengkajian Nilai-nilai Luhur Budaya Spiritual Bangsa Daerah Jawa
Timur. vol 1, Jakarta: Department of Education and Culture, 1991/1992.
Ramage, Douglas E. Politics in Indonesia Democracy. Islam and the Ideology of
Tolerance. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
Ricklefs, M.C. A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993.
Robson, Stuart and Singgih Wibisono. Javanese English Dictionary. Singapore: Periplus,
2002.
Schwartz, Adam. A Nation in Waiting Indonesia in the 1990s. New South Wales,
Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1994.
Sosrosudigdo, Sarwedi. Fungsi dan Arti Kebatinan untuk Pribadi dan Revolusi. Jakarta:
Balai Pustaka, 1965.
Stange, Paul. The Sumarah Movement in Javanese Mysticism. PhD Dissertation The
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980.
" 'Legitimate' Mysticism in Indonesia" in Review of Indonesian and
Malaysian Affairs vol 20(2) pp 76-117.
Leo Suryadinata. "Kong Hu Cuisme dan Agama Kong Hu Cu di Indonesia Sebuah Kajian


















Jr j1 ' 
JL
}( I S 7 5, t r t
+ I fati
. . .. 1 t i t t n'
.. 1 t. rJt 1 "t c t, iM1rtJ4".' 4 2
4 ~ i
J ., ! t y jt5 L\
1 
c(.
y J f i M11 S\LI}
IJ11 .
J - f11 t l.. '" 
1 "O.".{1 ¢1 5
3 1 1 t 1 'S. t 1 t(rSl 1 '.,?I.-,.-,*,.,..,..1 r t 5(y ! 3
( I 
'f LI { r 
r F141 r ti L 1 t
,f , {bt , .,
1 .',,y nl /5 I,,411 sA





4 L( t.. It iF/ Lt 1 YMI\
r R S } s 4
x.. rt LlY $
x { 
tt Ifs \{ 4 ILL 55 4_ .}
L 1 11 ~ L
41y 1
Y fS Y
.4 :.I ! r' w.( 4Lr41 hs 1ti L} tlltt 133 413 y ' 4 rt
\
l 
1} M}V 15 Y Yyf h451 i.
. S l-j tt I fL $1 I 's'N IYtia 
r
L 1 Y.'fll M i!
> tt 7s 1 110t
L , Yt 1
j IYI
. .: \ 5 M1 ..I:.,,,.} J. .1f 14 J
1 t 3.. 1 1 t LT F T1 4 etr \ J' -,
S 3 y fy I M V., ; t,;k FI 4 f 1111C } 11 
5
t s i Et'If ! J Y t,<
\ ( 
t jY 7
} t far 1 7 5r 1
" 
t. n I . A, ItsJt y 5 1
1 I5i y t
ltd y
V i 
.7 \ ( M Ir f7T
h
1 t 1 F itlst .11 1,








I J5 55 L 
1
.. -
} L '3 _y t,.




. .. i 5r5 Vti (1 1
1
S 1 / iryL
7 31 L
- .. ".. .... ... ... L.r. ti 11 41 . .
